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I Articles I
Implications of a Palestinian State for
Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A
Jurisprudential Assessment
Louis Ren6 Beres
I. Introduction
Normally, students of international law approach the question
of a Palestinian State from the standpoints of terrorism,' self-
1. For current conventions in force concerning terrorism, see generally
CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES AGAINST
INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC AGENTS.
Adopted by the, Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force for the United States, Feb. 20,
1977. 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S., No. 8532. Reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 43 (1974); see
generally VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, Apr. 18, 1961.
Entered into force for the United States, Dec. 13, 1972. 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; CONVENTION ON OFFENCES AND CERTAIN OTHER
ACTS COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT (TOKYO CONVENTION), Sept. 14,1963,
entered into force for the United States on Dec. 4, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 20
U.S.T. 2941; see generally CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL
SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HAGUE CONVENTION) of Dec. 16, 1970, entered into
force for the United States on Oct. 14, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1641; CONVENTION FOR
THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF CIVIL
AVIATION (MONTREAL CONVENTION) of Sept. 23, 1971, entered into force for
the United States on Jan. 26, 1973. 24 U.S.T. 564; see generally INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES, Adopted by GAOR 34/146
of Dec. 17, 1979. U.N. GAOR Off. Rec. 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 (A/34/46), p.
245; entered into force on June 3, 1983, entered into force for the United States
on Dec. 7, 1984; see generally EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF
TERRORISM OF JAN. 27, 1977, entered into force on August 4, 1978, E.T.S. 90; On
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determination 2 and human rights. Although such an approach is
altogether reasonable, it is also purposeful to examine the question
of Palestinian statehood from the perspectives of Israel's national
security, nuclear strategy, and regional nuclear war. With this in
mind, the following article undertakes this second form of examina-
tion, thereby adding an essential jurisprudential component to a
timely and urgent issue in world politics.
Whether or not a State of Palestine3 will come into existence
in the next several years is no longer problematic.4 When it does
December 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution
condemning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." See UNITED NATIONS RESOLU-
TION ON TERRORISM, U.N. GAOR 40/61 of Dec. 9, 1985, U.N. GAOR 40th Sess.,
Supp. No. 53 (A/40/53), p. 301. Never before had the General Assembly adopted
such a comprehensive resolution on this question. See id. Yet, the issue of
particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was left largely unaddressed,
except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking and attacks on internationally
protected persons that were criminalized by previous custom and conventions. See
id.
2. See Declaration on THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL
PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES (1960) G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); see also PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD
GUIDE THE MEMBERS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT AN OBLIGATION
EXISTS TO TRANSMIT THE INFORMATION CALLED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 73E OF
THE CHARTER (1960) U.N. GAOR 1541 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); see also DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION
AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WIT THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(1970) (The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples) U.N.
GAOR 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
3. Although the question of Palestinian statehood had become especially
public in late Spring 1999, a Palestinian "Declaration of Independence had been
issued more than ten years earlier-on November 15, 1988. This Declaration, by
the Palestine National Council, ". . . in the name of God, and in the name of the
Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the State of
Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Holy Jerusalem (AI-Quds
Ash-Sharif)." PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL: DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(Nov. 15, 1988), in WALTER LAQUEUR AND BARRY RUBIN, eds., THE ISRAEL-
ARAB READER; New York, Penguin Books, 1995, Fifth ed., pp. 542-546.
4. It is arguable, of course, that Jordan is already a Palestinian state. In fact,
it is the Arab state in Palestine, having been created in 1946 out of 78% of the
territory of the Palestinian Mandate. Jordan was, and remains, Eastern Palestine
(Israel is Western Palestine). British authorities suspended the Jewish National
Home Provisions of The Mandate for Palestine of the League of Nations in 1922,
but until 1946 Transjordan remained the Eastern province of Palestine, ruled by
Abdullah, Emir of the Hejaz, reporting to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem.
These authorities sought to separate Transjordan from Western Palestine, but they
could not do so legally until 1946, when Transjordan became an independent
sovereign state. From this standpoint, the issue is not whether Palestinians deserve
a state (because they already have Jordan), but whether they deserve two states.
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come into being,5 Israel's nuclear strategy' will surely be affected.
5. The PLO had announced its intention to declare a Palestinian state in
early May 1999-an intention that was not actualized. Addressing a rally in Nablus
on November 14, 1998, Arafat declared, "[we] will declare our independent state
on May 4, 1999, with Jerusalem as its capital." The National Unity Coalition for
Israel, "Arafat Again Calls for Palestinian State," Washington D.C., Nov. 16, 1998.
According to the Israel Government Press Office, such a unilateral declaration
would violate the Oslo Accords and the implementing Wye River Memorandum.
In the Press Office's statement of 15 November 1998, "[T]he Agreement under the
Oslo Accords and the Wye River Memorandum mandates the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to negotiate with Israel the permanent status of Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza." The September 28, 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) states, "[n]either
side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations." See id.
at Article XXXI(7). This article prohibits unilateral measures that would alter the
legal status of the areas (such as annexation or declaration of statehood). A
Palestinian declaration of statehood could also fail to satisfy the generally-accepted
criteria for statehood identified under international law: control over a fixed and
clearly defined territory, a population, a government, and the capacity to engage
in diplomatic and foreign relations. See, e.g. CONVENTION ON RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF STATES, done at Montevideo, Dec. 26, 1988. 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No.
881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, Article 1.
6. There is now a substantial body of literature that deals with Israel's
nuclear weapons status and strategy. See, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Israeli Nuclear
Weapons After Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests, SECURITY DIALOGUE, Vol. 29.,
No. 3., pp. 377-384; see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, In Support of Anticipatory Self-
Defence: Israel, Osiraq and International Law, CONTEM. SECURITY POL'Y, Vol. 19,
No. 2., Aug. 1998, pp. 111-114; see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Israel's Nuclear Strategy:
Ambiguity, Disclosure, Doctrine, DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, Vol. 26., No. 2., 209-
233 (Winter 1998); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, The Iranian Threat to Israel,
MIDSTREAM, Vol. 44, No. 6., 2-5 (Sept./Oct. 1998); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres,
Israel, the 'Peace Process,' and Nuclear Terrorism: Recognizing the Linkages,
STUDIES IN CONFLICrS AND TERRORISM, Vol. 21, No. 1., 59-86 (Jan. 1998); see,
e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and
Dangers to Israel of False Hope, ARMED FORCES AND Soc'Y, Vol. 23, No. 4., 539-
568 (Summer 1997); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, On Living in a Bad Neighborhood:
The Informed Argument for Israeli Nuclear Weapons," POL. CROSSROADS, Vol.
5., Nos 1/2, 143-157 (1997); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Where the Shadow Really
Falls: Why Israel Must Have Nuclear Weapons, BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF., Vol.
IV, Issue 1, 127-138 (Winter/Spring 1997); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Attrition,
Annihilation and the End of Israel: A Strategic and Jurisprudential View, U. DET.
MERCY L. REV., Vol. 73, Issue 3., 479-498 (Spring 1996); see, e.g. Louis Rene
Beres, The Oslo Accords and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, THE GEO. COMPASS, Vol.
V., No. 1., 74-81 (Winter 1996); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Nuclear
War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 1.,
No. 1., 65-97 (Spring 1996); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemp-
tion: Choosing the Least Unattractive Option Under International Law, DICK. J.
INT'L L., Vol. 14, No. 2., 187-206; see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, The Iranian Threat
to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions, INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE, Vol. 9., No. 1., 51-62 (Spring 1996); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Power and
Survival: Why Israel Needs Nuclear Weapons, INT'L J. GROUP TENSIONS, Vol. 26,
No. 1., 21-60 (Spring 1996); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, Israel's Bomb in the
Basement: A Revisiting of 'Deliberate Ambiguity,' vs. Disclosure, ISRAEL AFF., Vol.
1999]
232 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:2
And this strategy, in turn, will affect the probability of nuclear war
2., No. 1., 112-136 (Autumn 1995); see, e.g. Louis Rene Beres, The 'Peace Process'
and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, STRATEGIC REV., 35-47 (Winter 1995); Warren H.
Donnelly, Senior Specialist, ENR, ISRAEL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CRS Issue
Brief, 14 (Updated Mar. 13, 1989); see, e.g. Yair Evron, The Relevance and
Irrelevance of Nuclear Options in Conventional Wars: The 1973 October War,
JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL., 7, Nos. 1-2 (1984); see, e.g. SHAI FELDMAN, ISRAELI
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: A STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1982); see, e.g. Uri Bar-Joseph, The Hidden Debate: The
Formation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East, J. STRATEGIC STUD., 5, No.
2 (June 1982); see, e.g. RODNEY W. JONES, SMALL NUCLEAR FORCES (Washing-
ton Papers, No. 103: New York: Praeger, 1984); see, e.g. ROBERT HARKAVY,
SPECTER OF A MIDDLE EASTERN HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMAT-
IC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, Monograph
Series in World Affairs: Denver, (University of Denver Press, 1977); see, e.g. FUAD
JABBER, ISRAEL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PRESENT OPTIONS AND FUTURE
STRATEGIES (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971); see, e.g. Alan Dowty, "Israel
and Nuclear Weapons," MIDSTREAM 22 (Nov. 1976); see, e.g. Alan Dowty, Nuclear
Proliferation: The Israeli Case, INT'L STUD. Q. 22 (Mar. 1978); see, e.g. Efraim
Inbar, The Israeli Basement - With Bombs or Without?, CROSSROADS 8 (Win-
ter/Spring 1982); see, e.g. Shlomo Aronson, Nuclearization of the Middle East,
JERUSALEM Q. 2 (Winter 1977); see, e.g. Steven J. Rosen, Nuclearization and
Stability in the Middle East, JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL. 1 (Spring 1976); see, e.g.
LouIs RENt BERES, ED., SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
STRATEGY (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986); see, e.g. PETER PRY,
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984); see, e.g. PIERRE
PEAN, LES DEUX BOMBES (Paris: Fayard, 1982); see, e.g. David Twersky, Is
Silence Golden? Vanunu and Nuclear Israel, TIKKUN, (Jan./Feb. 1988); AVNER
YANIV, DETERRENCE WITHOUT THE BOMB: THE POLITICS OF ISRAELI STRATEGY
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987); see, e.g. SHYAM BHATIA, NUCLEAR
RIVAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST (New York and London: Routledge, 1988); see, e.g.
MITCHELL REISS, WITHOUT THE BOMB: THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIF-
ERATION (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). Three important books
on the subject, published in Hebrew, are: YAIR EVRON, ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
DILEMMA, (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, Hakibbutz Hameuchad. 1987); and DAVID
ISH SHALOM, HORROR AND HOPE (Jerusalem: Keshet, 1987). Additional useful
bibliography can be found in Donnelly, op cit., pp. 13-14. Donnelly also provides
a very informative chronology, beginning with Israel's bombing of the Iraqi reactor
on June 7, 1981, and concluding with Israeli-Norwegian consultation on Norwegian
heavy water supplied to Israel on December 15, 1988.
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in the Middle East.7 What, precisely, are the pertinent connec-
tions?8
Interestingly, an ironic connection exists between Israel's
posture on Judea/Samaria vs. Palestine and its nuclear strategy, i.e.,
a "hawkish" position on maintaining control over the remaining
territories (the position of Oslo9 opponents) is normally associated
7. Any such war could suffer termination difficulties because of the expansion
of information warfare capabilities. Important requirements for ending a nuclear
war would include: accurate and timely communication of a willingness to cease
fire; military compliance with settlement; stable command and control during war;
and verification of behavior expected in armistice. Information warfare, part of
the revolution in military affairs concerning computer, communications and
electronics technologies, has been identified by Stephen J. Cimbala as: "(1) a set
of techniques and technologies potentially capable of making qualitative changes
in the way that wars are fought; or (2) a way of thinking about the relationship
between technology and warfare, or about warfare in general, emphasizing the
brain and nervous system of the state and its armed forces." Stephen J. Cimbala,
INFORMATION WARFARE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPREAD: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONFLICT TERMINATION, (1998) (unpublished paper).
8. For early discussions of such pertinent connections by this author, see, e.g.
Louis Rend Beres, Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, MIDSTREAM, Vol.
XXXVII, No. 8, 8-9 (Nov. 1991); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, After the Gulf War:
Israel, Palestine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East, STRATEGIC REV.,
Vol. XIX, No. 4, 48-55 (Fall 1991); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, The Question of
Palestine and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, POL. Q., Vol. 62, No. 4, 451-460 (Oct. -
Dec. 1991); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, A Palestine State and Israel's Nuclear
Strategy, CROSSROADS: AN INT'L SOC.-POL. J., No. 31, 97-104 (1991); see, e.g.
Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War, BULL. PEACE
PROPOSALS, Vol. 22 (2), 227-234 (1991); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, A Palestinian
State-Implications for Israel's Security and the Possibility of Nuclear War, BULL.
OF THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE FOR WESTERN DEFENCE, Vol. 4, No. 3, 3-10 (Oct.
1991); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, Israeli Security in a Changing World, STRATEGIC
REV., Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 11-22 (Fall 1990); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, Palestine
and Nuclear War, JERUSALEM REP., 45 (Aug. 1, 1991); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres,
Israeli Nuclear Strategy, INT'L STUD. NOTES, Spring 1990; see, e.g. Louis Rend
Beres, The Growing Threat of Nuclear War in the Middle East, JERUSALEM J.
INT'L REL., Vol. 12, No. 1, 1-27 (1990); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, Staring Down
the Specter of Nuclear War, ISRAELI DEMOCRACY, Vol. 2, No. 2/3,44-48 (Summer,
Fall 1988); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, Perils of Nuclearism, PRESENT TENSE, Vol.
15, No. 6, 60 (Sept./Oct. 1988); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, Nuclear Weapons and
Nuclear War in the Middle East, TRANSNAT'L PERSP., Vol. 12, No. 1, 8-13 (1986);
see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, Israel, Force and International Law: Assessing
Anticipatory Self-Defense, JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL., Vol. 13, No. 2, 1-14 (June
1991); see, e.g. Louis Rend Beres, ISRAELI SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
PSIS Occasional Papers, Number 1/1990, Programme For Strategic and Interna-
tional Security Studies, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva,
Switzerland, 40.
9. "Oslo" is used here as a shorthand for the Middle East Peace Process.
This Israel-Palestinian process consists of five agreements: (1) Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr-P.L.O.,
32 ILM 1525; (2) Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza
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with a "dovish" position on nuclear strategy (because, inter alia,
Israel has substantially greater strategic depth l" under extant
conditions). Hence, an expected victory for the Israeli Left (the
position of Oslo supporters) on Palestine (originally a declining
population following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait11 and the resultant
Gulf War1") would suggest an expanded reliance by Israel on
Strip and the Jericho Area, Isr.-PLO, 33 ILM 622 (May 4, 1994) (signed in Cairo);
(3) Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities, Isr-PLO, 34 ILM, 455
(Aug. 29, 1994); (4) Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities,
Isr.-PLO., 34 ILM 455 (Aug. 27, 1995); and (5) Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, Isr.-PLO, (Sept. 28, 1995) (signed in Washington D.C.).
10. Israeli security is endangered by a lack of "strategic depth." Requiring
substantial distance between its own forces and those of its enemies, Israel
has-already-precious little room for maneuver. At the same time, the Arab
confrontation states, especially Syria and Iraq, enjoy so large a numerical troop
advantage that they could begin large-scale attacks which would catch Israel by
surprise. Moreover, because of Israel's massive dependence on a reserve system,
Syria or Iraq would have to deal with only a relatively small IDF (Israeli) force
for many long hours.
11. For documentation of Iraqi crimes, see: Amnesty International News
Release, Iraqi Forces Killings (sic) and Torturing in Kuwait, Says Amnesty
International Fact-Finding Team, Al Index: MDE 14/15/90. Distr. SC/PO (Oct. 3,
1990), a preliminary report on widespread charges of Iraqi torture, willful killing,
rape, pillage and collective reprisals. See Amnesty International Report,
Iraq/Occupied Kuwait Human Rights Violations Since 2 August, AI Index MDE
14/16/90. Distr. SC/CO/GR (Dec. 19, 1990). For personal testimonies of Iraqi
brutalities, see N.Y. TIMES, at A17, col. 1 (Jan. 14, 1991); and Shafeeq Ghabra,
The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
Vol. XX, No. 2, Issue 78, 112-125 (Winter 1991). Further documentation can be
found at: CIVIL WAR IN IRAQ, A staff report, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senate, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 28 (May 1991) (Com. Print); CRISIS
IN THE PERSIAN GULF: SANCTIONS, DIPLOMACY AND WAR. Hearings.
Committee on Armed Services, House, Washington, 1991. 920 (Dec. 4-20, 1990)
(H.A.S.C. No. 101-57); HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ, Hearing,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 192
(Jan.9, 1991); THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, Joint Hearings, Subcommittees on Arms
Control, International Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on
International Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic
Committee, Washington, 576 (Aug. 8 - Dec. 11, 1990).
12. Coalition military action against Iraqi forces commenced on January 16,
1991. This collective resort to force represented a last attempt to remove Iraqi
military forces from Kuwait, which had been occupied since Saddam Hussein's
invasion of August 2, 1990. On the very same day of the Iraqi invasion, U.N.
SCOR 660: (1) Condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; (2) Demanded that Iraq
withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which
they were located on August 1, 1990; (3) Called upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin
immediately intensive negotiations for the resolutions of their differences and
support all efforts in this regard, especially those of the League of Arab States.
The war ended when Iraq formally accepted all of the United States-led coalition's
terms for a permanent ceasefire on March 3, 1991. Significantly, although
elimination of all Iraqi nonconventional force capabilities was an integral part of
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nuclear deterrence. We will, therefore, examine the precise forms
such an expanded reliance might take. But first let us consider
why, exactly, Palestine would represent new and significant danger
to Israel.
II. The Regional Danger From Palestine
When-as a result of the Oslo Accords' 3-West Bank
(Judea/Samaria) and Gaza become Palestine, Israel's vulnerability
to armed attack by Arab neighbors would increase markedly.
Recognizing an "improved" balance of forces vis-A-vis Israel,14 a
larger number of Arab states would calculate that they now
confront a smaller, more beleaguered adversary-one deprived of
former strategic depth and one whose military forces are more
preoccupied with Palestine than they ever were with the intifada.
Fearing even total defeat-the End of the Third Temple Common-
wealthlS-Israel could find itself resorting for the first time to
the ceasefire agreement, Iraq continued after the war to seek a thermonuclear
weapons capacity and to disguise this effort from UN inspectors.
13. Oslo 1, known generally as the Declaration of Principles, was concluded
and signed in Oslo on August 19, 1993, and resigned in Washington D.C. on
September 13, 1993. Oslo 2 was signed in Washington on September 28, 1995.
For a complete compendium of the documentary record, up to the signing of Oslo
2, cf. Institute for Palestine Studies: The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement (Rev.
2d ed., 1994); cf Institute for Palestine Studies: The Palestinian-Israeli Peace
Agreement, 306 (Rev. 2nd ed., 1994). See also B'TZEDEK (Israel), Vol. 1., No. 1.,
105-144 (Spring 1997).
14. Regarding this balance of forces, the reader should consider the following
broad context of pertinent military balance: The Arab world is presently comprised
of twenty-two states of nearly five million square miles and 144 million people.
The Islamic world contains forty-four states with one billion people. The Islamic
states comprise an area 672 times the size of Israel. Israel, with a population of
fewer than five million Jews, is, together with Judea/Samaria and Gaza, less than
half the size of San Bernardino County in California. The Sinai Desert alone,
which Israel transferred to Egypt in the 1979 Treaty, is three times larger than the
State of Israel. See: Louis Rene Beres, Response to John Quigley, AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y, Vol. 12., No. 3., 514 (1997).
15. There is, of course, nothing new about such "Third Temple" views
concerning Israel's very existence. From the first, Arab states have regarded Israel
as the institutionalized manifestation of multiple crimes, particularly colonialism,
imperialism and aggression. Indeed, often denounced as "an instrument of evil,"
constructed "on a foundation of evil," Israel is taken to be immutably criminal,
irremediable, fit only for liquidation/extermination. See, e.g. the discussion of The
External Aspect: Aggression, Intrigues, Exploitation, in YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI,
ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL, Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House Ltd., 307-310
(1972). Regarding undisguised expressions of approval for liquidation or
extermination, Yehoshafat Harkabi undertook a linguistic analysis of Arab state-
ments. Here is what he discovered:
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threats of nuclear deterrence and, should the threats not be taken
"Liquidation" or "ending" (qada"ald), the expression with the highest
frequency; "wiping out" (mahq, mahai), "purification" or "cleansing"
(tasfiya); "removal" (izala, izaha); "throwing into the sea"; "death
sentence"; "throttling"; "crushing" (sahq); "destruction"; "ruination"
(tadmir); "pulling up by the root" (isti'sal); "eradication"; "overthrow"
(isiqat); "sweeping out" (iktisah); "bringing to an end" (inha'); "elimi-
nation" (fand') and the like. All these terms emphasize action to
implement the liquidation.
Here are a few examples:
"Arab unity means the liquidation (al-qadd"ald) of Israel and the
expansionist dreams of Zionism." (Nasser at the Festival of Unity, Feb.
22, 1965).
The Arab people will pronounce the death sentence against criminal
Israel, namely disappearance."
"Israel is the cancer, the malignant wound, in the
body of Arabism, for which there is no cure but
eradication. There is no need to emphasize that
the liquidation of Israel and the restoration of the
plundered Palestine Arab land are at the head of
our national objectives." (Commentator on Cairo
Radio, Apr. 20, 1963 at 20:55 hrs.).
"The victory over the power of colonialism in Algeria was a brilliant
step for the overthrow of the base in the Maghreb, so that it should
be a prelude to the overthrow of another base for colonialism in the
East-I refer to Israel." (Nasser, July 3, 1962).
Direct expressions may be divided into two sub-groups: in the first, which covers
the majority, the active, liquidating factor is specified, or at least the action
necessitates an active factor, and it is clear that it will be the Arabs who will
initiate the operation, or at least participate in it. For instance: "Israel is a plague
which must be liquidated" implies that the Arabs must act for the achievement of
this goal.
In the second group, the liquidation is presented in somewhat more elegant
terms as a process that will take place itself, without the initiating factor being
specified.
Such formulae include expressions like: "disappearance," "Israel will
disappear" (takhtafi), "collapse" (inhiydr); "clearing out" (zawal), "downfall"
(suqut); "Israel will not escape her inevitable fate," "Israel will die" or "the end
of Israel" (nihayat Isra'il); "non-survival" or "non-existence" (ld baqa').
According to al-Ahram, for instance, Ben Bella declared on May 1, 1965:
"There is a need for Israel to disappear, for it is an artificial creation and
it is necessary to put an end to it" (wa-yanbaghT al-qadd' 'alayha) (May
2, 1965). "No Arab Unity Without the Disappearance of Israel" (name
of pamphlet issued by Arab Higher Committee, Cairo, Nov. 1958).
"The fate of this State is extinction, for it was born dead" (al-MahldwT
in EGYPTIAN POL. SCI. R., Jan.-Mar. 1959, 1.118).
Even where the process is described as taking place of its own accord,
the meaning may be more active, e.g.:
"The collapse of Israel, this is the hope in which we live. The time has
come for us to consider it, to discuss and map out the road to this
collapse." (Ahmad Sa'id, the Director of Cairo Radio (Sawt al-'Arab),
in his introduction to Sabri Abu al-Majd's book, The End of Israel, 1960).
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seriously, the actual retaliatory use of nuclear weapons."
Of course, one must compare the risks to Israel of a neighbor-
ing state of Palestine with those of continuing control over the
remaining territories. Should Israel have maintained possession of
these lands, a combined attack by several Arab states could have
benefitted from the anti-Israel exploits of a new intifada, exploits
that might have escalated under such conditions. Diverted from
the central effort to resist Arab armies, Israel-because of its still
precarious rule over hostile Palestinian populations-could have
been be weakened considerably. Yet, its overall position would
16. For assessments of nuclear weapons under international law, cf. Burns H.
Weston, Nuclear Weapons and the World Court: Ambiguity's Consensus,
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Vol. 7., No. 2., 371-399 (Fall 1997); The
Illegality of Nuclear Weapons: Statement of the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear
Policy, ALTERNATIVES: A J. WORLD POL'Y, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 291-296 (Fall 1982);
see also RICHARD FALK, ELLIOTr MEYROWITZ AND JACK SANDERSON, NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Center of International Studies, Princeton
University, World Order Studies Monograph, (1981); see also John H.E. Fried,
First Use of Nuclear Weapons-Existing Prohibitions in International Law, BULL.
OF PEACE PROPOSALS, 21-29 (Jan. 1981); see also Matthew Lippman, Nuclear
Weapons and International Law: Towards A Declaration on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear Humancide, LOY.L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.,
Vol. 8, No. 2, 183-234 (1986); see also Burns Weston, Nuclear Weapons and
International Law: Illegality in Context, DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, (1983); see also
I. Brownlie, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, INT'L & COMP.
L.Q., Vol. 14, (1965); see also Francis A. Boyle, The Relevance of International
Law to the 'Paradox' of Nuclear Deterrence, Nw. U. L. REV., Vol. 80, No. 6, 1407-
1448 (Summer 1986); see also James A. Stegenga, Nuclearism and International
Law, PUB. AFF. Q., Vol. 4, No. 1, 69-80 (Jan. 1990); see also GEOFFREY BEST,
HUMANITY IN WARFARE (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); see also
JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); see also ISTVAN POGANY, ed.,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1987); see also Daniel J. Arbess, The International Law of Armed Conflict in Light
of Contemporary Deterrence Strategies: Empty Promise or Meaningful Restraint?
MCGILL L. J., Vol. 30, 89-142 (1984); see also E.D. Thomas, Atomic Bombs in
International Society, AM. J. INT'L L., Vol. 39, 736-744 (Oct. 1945); see also E.C.
Stowell, Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb,AM. J. INT'L L., Vol. 39, 784-788 (Oct.
1945); see also John Norton Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing
Strategic Stability, BROOK. J. INT'L L., Vol. 9, No. 2, 263-268 (Summer 1983); see
also Eugene V. Rostow, The Great Nuclear Debate, YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD.,
Vol. 8, 87-102 (1981); see also Elliott L. Meyrowitz, The Opinions of Legal
Scholars on the Legal Status of Nuclear Weapons, STAN. J. INT'L L., Vol. 24, Issue
1, 111-177; see also Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law:
A Contextual Reassessment, MCGILL L. J., Vol. 28, No. 3, 543-590 (July 1983); see
also John H.E. Fried, The Nuclear Collision Course: Can International Law Be of
Help, DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, Vol. 14, No. 1, 97-120 (Spring/Summer 1985);
see also FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE CRIMINALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation, Booklet #27, Waging Peace Series, 13 (Santa Barbara, CA:
Apr. 1991).
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have been weakened less by such rebellion than it will be weak-
ened by another hostile state on its eastern borders. Therefore,
Israel would have been less inclined to threaten or to use nuclear
weapons if Jerusalem had maintained jurisdiction over the
territories.
A two-state solution to the Palestinian problem17 will not
reduce the incentive of present Arab governments to war against
Israel." Indeed, it may well increase this incentive, probably via
17. For the Palestinian Authority, acceptance of the "Two-State solution" is
merely part of the broader strategy of ultimate incorporation of Israel itself into
Palestine. This complete removal of Israel has doctrinal roots in the PLO's
"Phased Plan" of June 9, 1974. Here, in its 12th Session, the PLO's highest body,
the Palestinian National Council, reiterated the PLO's aim as being to achieve
"their rights to return and to self-determination on the whole of their homeland."
However, departing from its previous strategy which called for the immediate
elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state over all of
"Palestine," the Phased Plan was adopted as follows: "FIRST, to establish a
combatant national authority over every part of Palestinian territory that is
liberated" (Art. 2); SECOND, to use that territory to continue the fight against
Israel (Art. 4); and THIRD, to start a pan-Arab War to complete the liberation
of all Palestinian territory, i.e., to eliminate Israel (Art. 8)." For full text of the
Phased Plan, as drawn up in Cairo, see B'TZEDEK, Appendix. Significantly, the
official maps of the Palestinian Authority identify all of Israel as "Palestine." See
Morton A. Klein, Arafat's Maps Still Show All of Israel as 'Palestine,' THE JEWISH
PRESS, 11 (Mar. 26, 1999).
18. The agreements that put an end to the first Arab-Israeli War (1947-1949)
were general armistice agreements negotiated bilaterally between Israel and Egypt
on February 24, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 251-70, 1949); Israel and Lebanon on Mar. 23,
1949 (42 U.N.T.S. 287-98. 1949); Israel and Jordan on April 3, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S.
Apr. 303-20, 1949); and between Israel and Syria on July 20, 1949 (42 U.N.T.S.
327-40, 1949). Pursuant to these agreements, the Security Council, on August 11,
1949, issued a Resolution which, inter alia, "noted with satisfaction the several
Armistice Agreements," and "Finds that the Armistice Agreements constitute an
important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and
considers that these agreements supersede the truce provided for in Security
Council resolutions 50 (1948) of 29 May and 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948. See
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NOTING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND
REAFFIRMING THE ORDER TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE
PENDING A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT, Aug. 11, 1949, SCOR 73, 1949, 4 U.N.
SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1949, at 8, 1965, U.N.
Doc. S/1376, II, 1949. With the exceptions of Egypt and Jordan, none of the
aforelisted armistice agreements has been superseded by an authentic peace treaty.
A general armistice is a war convention, an agreement or contract concluded
between belligerents. Such an agreement does not result in the termination of a
state of war. The 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, stipulates, at the Annex to the Convention, that "An armistice
suspends military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties."
See CONVENTION No. IV RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON
LAND, WITH ANNEX OF REGULATIONS. Done at The Hague (Oct. 18, 1907)
(emphasis added). Entered into force, Jan. 26, 1910. 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539,
1 Bevans 631, at Chapter V, Art. 36.). The courts of individual states have also
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an attrition/annihilation strategy.1 9 This means that the critical
factor in determining probable Israeli recourse to nuclear deter-
rence and/or nuclear weapons is the perceived effect of Palestine
upon Israel's vulnerability. Because this effect will almost certainly
be greater than that of even persistent and expanded uprising in
the territories, transforming the territories into an independent
state will enlarge the risk of nuclear war in the region.
Let me be more precise. When an independent Palestine is
declared,2" its president will be Yasir Arafat, and its principal
affirmed the principle that an armistice does not end a war. See, e.g. Kahn v.
Anderson, Warden, 255 U.S. 1 (1921). Indeed, throughout history, armistices have
normally envisaged a resumption of hostilities. It follows from this that since no
treaties of peace obtain between Israel and the Arab states with which it negotiat-
ed armistice agreements in 1949 (again, with the prominent exceptions of Egypt
and Jordan), a condition of belligerency continues to exist between these states
and Israel. (For pertinent documents and commentary on Israel-Arab agreements,
see Rosalyn Higgins, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967, 1., The Middle
East, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, a study issued under the auspices
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.) For pertinent commentary and
documents on the historic status of relations between the Arab states and Israel,
see COLONEL TREVOR N. DuPuY (US ARMY, RET.), ELUSIVE VICTORY: THE
ARAB-ISRAELI WARS, 1947 - 1974 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) especially
Chapter 12; see also JOHN NORTON MOORE, ED., THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT,
VOLUME III, DOCUMENTS (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1974), especially Part II.
19. Traditionally, attrition is designed to wear down an enemy by constant
pressure in order to weaken, exhaust or destroy that enemy's forces. The word
"attrition" derives from the Latin attere (to weaken) that comes from terrere (to
rub). In the particular sense of current Arab/Islamic war against Israel, the
strategy of exhausting or destroying Israel's armed forces (IDF) is only an
intermediate goal. The overriding objective of this war is annihilation of the State
of Israel. For more specialized treatment of the concept, war of attrition, see
Dermot Bradley, War of Attrition, in 6 INT'L MIL. AND DEF. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
2902-06 (Trevor N. Dupuy, ed., 1993). In the traditional military sense, the term
annihilation "is not synonymous with its nonmilitary sense of complete destruc-
tion." Rather, it means "to take action that causes an enemy force to be totally
incapable of further resistance." See id. at 2902. In the particular context of
Arab/Islamic war against Israel, however, annihilation is synonymous with the
nonmilitary meaning of complete and utter devastation. It is such devastation, not
"merely" the incapacitation of Israel's armed forces, that Israel's enemies (state
and nonstate) seek.
20. This declaration, of course, will include a statement that Jerusalem is the
capital of Palestine. Yet, Jerusalem has long been a Jewish city. For Muslims, it
is not Jerusalem, but Mecca, that is of paramount importance. It is Mecca, not
Jerusalem, to which Muslims must pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime. Jews at
prayer anywhere in the world face toward the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.
Muslims, even those praying on the Mount, face away from it, and toward Mecca.
When they pray on the Mount, Muslims have their backs toward the Dome of the
Rock, while those praying in the AI-Asqa mosque also look away from Jerusalem
and toward Mecca. In the Hebrew Bible, Jerusalem is mentioned 656 times;
Jerusalem's well-being is central to all Jewish prayer. In the Koran, Jerusalem is
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leaders will be drawn from the PLO chairman's faction, Al
Fatah.21  Probably within hours of the new state's effective
beginnings, its government and its ruling elite will be targeted by
PLO radicals and by Palestinian parties opposed to PLO. Among
the radicals, some (e.g., Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine)
might represent Syrian interests and others (e.g., Arab Liberation
Front and Palestine Liberation Front) might front for Iraq.22
Among the anti-PLO parties, most (e.g., Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command; Popular Struggle
Front; the Abu Musa organization and Saiqa) are tied intimately to
Syria and one (Fatah Revolutionary Council)-known popularly as
the Abu Nidal group-is linked to Libya. Samir Gosheh's Popular
Struggle Front currently displays more independence from Syria
than Ahmed Jebril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine-General Command, and Saiqa is essentially an integral Syrian
force with only nominal Palestinian identity.
We see that many factions will contend for control over the
new state of Palestine 3 and that virtually all of these factions will
never mentioned, not even once. See MARTIN GILBERT, JERUSALEM: PAST AND
FUTURE (Institute of the World Jewish Congress, Policy Forum 1., Nov. 1994).
See also Louis Rene Beres, Response to John Quigley, AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y, Vol. 12, No. 3., 513 (1997).
21. Regarding the criminal responsibility of the individual Fatah perpetrators
of terrorist crimes committed under Arafat's direction, the principle is well-
established that orders pursuant to "domestic law" (in these cases, by analogy,
Fatah "law") are no defense to violations of international law. See VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, ART. 27, U.N. CONFERENCE ON LAW
OF TREATIES, Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, (May 23, 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969); see also FREE ZONES OF UPPER SAVOY AND THE DISTRICr OF GEX (Fr.
v. Switz), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 46, at 167; see also TREATMENT OF POLISH
NATIONALS IN DANZIG (parties abbreviated), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at
24; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES Sec. 3.2 (collected in: Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept of State,
Memorandum on the Application of International Law to Iranian Exchange
Regulations (Feb. 15, 1984), reprinted in 130 CONG. REC.S. 1679, 1682 (1984).
22. Iraq had been an aggressor against Israel from the start. Baghdad sent
significant numbers of expeditionary forces in the 1948 War of Independence, the
Six Day (1967) War, and the Yom Kippur (1973) War. During the 1948 War,
Iraqi forces entered Trans-Jordan and engaged Israeli forces in Western Samaria.
In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Iraqi forces, which were again deployed in
Jordan, remained there for more than two years. During the 1973 War, Baghdad
committed about one-third of its then 95,000 man armed forces to assist Syria in
its campaign against the IDF on the Golan Heights.
23. For a comprehensive scholarly treatment of fragmented authority within
the Palestinian community, see Rashid Khalidi, Policymaking Within the
Palestinian Polity, in JUDITH KIPPER AND HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, THE MIDDLE
EASE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 59-81 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
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resort, unhesitatingly, to high levels of violence.24 Before long, the
resident Palestinian population will suffer far more than it has
under Israeli rule and anarchy will pose a real threat to Jordan.
Over time, it is likely that Jordan will be undermined altogether
and that Syria will gain control over Palestine as a "peacemaker."
Of course, Iraq, too, could gain a controlling position in Palestine,
but this would depend upon the power of its Palestinian surrogates
vis-A-vis those of the regime in Damascus. Ironically, the result of
these events-of another Lebanon-would be enormously tragic for
both Palestinians who seek a homeland and for Israelis who seek
secure frontiers.
It follows from all of this that Palestine could pose a serious
security risk to Israel, and that this risk may be far greater than
that of maintaining/regaining possession of Judea/Samaria. This
does not mean that Israel and the Palestinians should steer clear of
meaningful negotiations or that Israel should avoid concerning itself
with protecting the essential human rights of any non-citizen Arab
populations under its control.' But it does mean that reasonable
24. Significantly, as is obvious from recent events, inter-Arab violence has
always been endemic in the Middle East and would surely undermine regional
stability whatever Israel agreed to concerning the "Palestinian problem." Long
before the recent Gulf War, Egypt occupied Yemen for eight years. Morocco and
Algeria were routinely in armed confrontations. Libya clashed with Egypt, Tunisia
and the Sudan. And Saudi Arabia, which has recently purchased CSS2-class
surface-to-surface missiles from China (that could reach any part of the Middle
East from Riyadh) financed Syrian arms acquisitions. Moreover, Arab states have
been in conflict with non-Arab states in the region other than Israel. Libya
launched invasions against Chad; Syria vowed to annex portions of Turkey ("as
soon as we settle the score with the Zionist enemy") and Iraq, of course, began
the prior Gulf War with post-revolutionary Iran.
25. See UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.
GAOR 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); see also EUROPEAN
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, Done at Rome (Nov. 4., 1950). Entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953,
Europe T.S. No. 5., CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES.
Done at Geneva, July 28, 1951. Entered into force, Apr. 22, 1954. 189 U.N.T.S.
137 (This Convention should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966, and
entered into force, Oct. 4, 1967); see also CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL
RIGHTS OF WOMEN, done at New York, Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force for the
United States, July 7, 1976. 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135;
see also DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL
COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES, Dec. 14, 1960, U.N. GAOR 1514 (XV), 15 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961); see also INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
opened for signature, Mar. 7, 1966. Entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969. 660 U.N.T.S.
195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); see also INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966.
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assessments of Israel's security compare the expected costs of
terminating Oslo with that of Palestinian independence. In the
absence of such a comparison, Israel could go from bad to worse,
from a situation that is debilitating and demoralizing to one that is
altogether intolerable.
III. The Dangers of Demilitarization
The hidden dangers of demilitarization are clear and compel-
ling. The threat of Palestine to Israel will lie not only in the
presence or absence of a national armed force, but also in the many
other Arab armies and terrorists that will inevitably compete for
power in the new country.
But there is another reason why a "demilitarized" Palestine
would present Israel with a substantial security threat: Internation-
al law would not necessarily expect Palestinian compliance with
pre-state agreements concerning military deployments and armed
force. From the standpoint of international law, enforcing
demilitarization upon an independent state of Palestine would be
exceedingly problematic. As a sovereign state, Palestine might not
even be bound by any pre-independence compacts that were
secured by U.S. guarantees. In this connection, international law
imposes unequal obligations on state and nonstate parties to
agreements. In a concurring statement in the case of Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, a 1981 civil suit in U.S. federal courts
(where plaintiffs were Israeli survivors and representatives of
persons murdered in a terrorist bus attack in Israel in 1978), Circuit
Judge Harry T. Edwards stated:
I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same responsi-
bility or liability on nonstate actors, such as the PLO, as it does
on states and persons acting under color of state law.
Entered into force, Jan. 3,1976. U.N. GAOR 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967),
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, opened for
signature, Dec. 19, 1966. Entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976. U.N.G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in
I.L.M. 368 (1967); see also AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, done at
San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force, July 18, 1978. O.A.S. Treaty Series
No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted
in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional
Protocol of 1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights-known collectively as the International Bill of Rights-serve as
the touchstone for the normative protection of human rights.
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Regarding the validity of Oslo under international law, this
statement reveals that the Palestinian Authority (PA) that is the
nonstate party to Oslo and Wye cannot be held jurisprudentially to
the same standards of accountability as the State of Israel. This is
a most important point to keep in mind when assessing the prospec-
tive viability of plans for Palestinian demilitarization.
Because treaties can be binding only upon states, 26 an
agreement between a non-state Palestine Authority (PA)27 and
one or more states would be of no real authority and little real
effectiveness. 28  Technically, an agreement on demilitarization
under international law must always be "between states." Hence,
any agreement on demilitarization that would include a nonstate
party would be prima facie null and void.
But what if the government of Palestine were willing to
consider itself bound by the pre-state, non-treaty agreement, i.e., to
treat this agreement as if it were an authentic treaty? Even in
these relatively favorable circumstances, the new Arab government
would have ample pretext to identify various grounds for lawful
treaty termination. It could, for example, withdraw from the
agreement because of what it regarded as a "material breach" (an
alleged violation by Israel that undermined the object or purpose
of the treaty). Or it could point toward what international law calls
26. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is
always an international agreement "concluded between states ...... Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). For the requirements of statehood under interna-
tional law, see Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 (Dec. 26, 1933).
27. See CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, supra, n.26;
see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Here, in seeking favorable classification for litigation, the P.L.O. requested the
court to accept its self-description as a state. See id. at 857. More precisely, the
P.L.O. characterized itself as "the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian
people ...." Id. The court, however, found the P.L.O. to be an "unincorporated
association." Id. at 858. It determined that the P.L.O. lacked the key elements
of statehood as articulated by long-settled norms of international law. Id. (citing
National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M.T. Stolt Sheaf, 860 F. 2d 551, 553 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091 (1989) and quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Sec. 201 (1987).
28. International law does recognize that insurgent organizations are not per
se ineligible from entering into agreements with states. In certain residual
circumstances, such agreements may be valid. See also H. LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS, VOL. II, 1975, pp. 494-495; I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4TH ED., 1990, PART
II, pp. 65-66; and CHEN, RECOGNITION, 1951. See also: CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN A DIVIDED WORKD, 1986, p. 81.
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a "fundamental change of circumstances" (rebus sic stantibus). In
this connection, should a small but expanding Palestine declare
itself vulnerable to previously unforseen dangers -perhaps from
the forces of other Arab armies-it could lawfully end its codified
commitment to remain demilitarized.
Rebus sic stantibus means, literally, "so long as conditions
remain the same." It is a legal doctrine with a long history. In the
traditional view, the obligation of a treaty terminates when a
change occurs in those circumstances that exist at the effective date
of the agreement and whose continuance forms a tacit condition of
the ongoing validity of the treaty. The function of the doctrine,
therefore, is to execute the shared intentions of the parties. Rebus
sic stantibus becomes operative when there is a change in the
circumstances that formed the cause, motive or rationale of
consent.29
There is another factor that explains why a treaty-like
arrangement obligating a new Palestinian state to accept demilitar-
ization could quickly and legally be invalidated after independence.
The usual grounds that may be invoked under domestic law to
invalidate contracts also apply under international law to treaties.
This means that "Palestine" could point to errors of fact or to
duress as perfectly appropriate grounds for termination.
Moreover, any treaty is void if, at the time it was entered into,
it was in conflict with a "peremptory" rule of general international
law (jus cogens) - a rule accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of states as one from which "no derogation is
permitted."3  Because the right of sovereign states to maintain
military forces essential to "self defense"31 is certainly such a rule,
Palestine could (depending upon its particular form of authority)
29. For an informed scholarly treatment of this doctrine, see ARIE E. DAVID,
THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION, 3-55 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1975).
30. See VIENNA CONVENTION, supra, at art. 53. Even a treaty is subordinate
to peremptory expectations: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." Id.
31. This right extends to both the customary right of anticipatory self-defense
and to the codified right of post-attack self-defense. Regarding the right of
anticipatory self-defense, states do not always have to wait until after an attack has
been absorbed before embarking upon self-defense. Rather, where the threat is
sufficiently imminent in point of time, they can choose to strike first, providing,
of course, that the strike is within the parameters of discrimination, proportionality
and military necessity. Regarding the codified right of post-attack self defense, see
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945.
Entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945; for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat.
1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043; at art. 51.
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be entirely within its right to abrogate any treaty that had com-
pelled its demilitarization.
A theory, following Hegelian ideas, is that any treaty obliga-
tion may be terminated unilaterally following changes in conditions
that make performance of the treaty injurious to fundamental
rights, especially the rights of existence, self-preservation and
independence. These rights have been summarized in law as
"rights of necessity. ''3 2
Thomas Jefferson, who had read Epicurus, Cicero and Seneca,
as well as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Holbach, Helvetius and Beccaria
(and who became something of a philosopher himself) wrote as
follows about obligation and international law:
The Moral duties which exist between individual and individual
in a state of nature, accompany them into a state of society and
the aggregate of the duties of all the individuals composing the
society constitutes the duties of that society towards any other,
so that between society and society the same moral duties exist
as did between the individuals composing them while in an
unassociated state, their maker not having released them from
those duties on their forming themselves into a nation.
Compacts then between nation and nation are obligatory on
them by the same moral law which obliges individuals to
observe their compacts. There are circumstances however
which sometimes excuse the non-performance of contracts
between man and man; so are there also between nation and
nation. When performance, for instance, becomes impossible,
non-performance is not immoral. So if performance becomes
self-destructive to the party, the law of self-preservation
overrules the laws of obligation to others.33
Later, Jefferson concludes:
As every treaty ought to be made by a sufficient power, a treaty
pernicious to the state is null, and not at all obligatory; no
governor of a nation having power to engage things capable of
destroying the state, for the safety of which the empire is
trusted to him. The nation itself, bound necessarily to whatever
32. See: ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION supra at
19; and Harvard Research, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L., 666, 1100 (Supp.,
1935).
33. See Jefferson's, Opinion on the French Treaties (Apr. 28, 1793) in MERRILL
D. PETERSON, ED., THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 113 - 114
(Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation: 1993).
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its preservation and safety require, cannot enter into engage-
ments contrary to its indispensable obligations."34
Here it must also be remembered that, historically, demilitar-
ization is a principle applied to various "zones,"35 not to still-
emergent states in their entirety. For some examples of demilita-
rized zones, consider the following: In 348 B.C., a treaty between
Rome and Carthage included a provision for the neutralization of
Corsica, a neutral zone "in the middle" (Corsica esset media inter
Romanos et Carthaginienses.) The Treaty of Radzin in 1681
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires created a vast buffer
zone between both parties south of Kiev. More modern forms of
demilitarization were developed in the nineteenth century from
measures that prohibited fortifications in designated areas, normally
imposed by the victor upon the vanquished.
After World War I, Germany, as a consequence of the
Versailles Treaty, had to demilitarize the Rhineland. Permanent
demilitarized zones have been created in the Straits of Magellan
(by the border treaty of 1881 between Argentina and Chile); in the
Aaland Islands belonging to Finland (according to the Aaland
Islands Convention of 1921 between Finland, Sweden and other
European powers); and in Norway's Svalbard Archipelago and
Bear Island (by terms of the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty of 1920
between Norway, the United States and the former Soviet Union.
The Outer Space Treaty of 27 January 1967 demilitarizes the moon
and other celestial bodies (prohibiting the stationing of nuclear
weapons and other mass destruction weapons) while Antarctica has
been demilitarized by the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959.
From these examples, we see that a new state of Palestine
might have yet another legal reason not to comply with pre-
independence commitments to demilitarization. As it could be
alleged, inter alia, that these commitments are inconsistent with
traditional bases of authoritative international law - bases found in
treaties and conventions; international custom; 36  the general
34. See id. at 115.
35. The Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol
I) contains detailed provisions on demilitarized zones.
36. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
describes international custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (July
26, 1945). Norms of customary international law bind all states regardless of
whether or not a state has ratified pertinent codifying instruments or conventions.
International law compartmentalizes apparently identical rights and obligations
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principles of law recognized by "civilized nations;" etc.37 - they are
commitments of no binding character.
Now, it is certainly possible (albeit unnecessary) that a state of
Palestine would act contrary to its legal commitments on demilitar-
ization. Here the demilitarization "remedy" could prove no less
injurious to Israel. One can easily imagine what would happen if -
following a clear breach of the Palestinian demilitarization
commitment - Israel would be compelled to act militarily. In such
circumstances, the entire global community, including the United
States, s  would likely respond to imperative Israeli self-de-
fense/law enforcement actions with both private pressures and
public denunciations of Israel in the U.N. Security Council. The
term "law enforcement" applies here because of the persistently
Westphalian (decentralized) nature of international law and its
derivation from underlying natural law. According to Blackstone,
the Law of Nations (International Law) is deducible from natural
law and is therefore binding upon all individuals and states. Each
state is expected "to aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of
the common law; by inflicting an adequate punishment upon
offenses against that universal law . . . .""
Additionally, there would be a great deal of internal pressure
within Israel, with the Israeli Left claiming yet again that this or
that Palestinian violation4" is not a clear and present danger to
arising both out of customary law and of treaty law: "Even if two norms belonging
to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the
states in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and that
of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence." Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), I.C.J. 14, 95 (June 27, 1986).
37. These authoritative bases of international law are drawn, of course, from
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See Statute, done
at San Francisco, June 26, 1945. Entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945; for the United
States, Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N.
1052.
38. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
international law forms part of the law of the United States. (U.S. Constitution,
art. VI). This incorporation is reaffirmed and broadened by various U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d, 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
39. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, Book 4, Of Public Wrongs.
40. The documentation of PLO violations of Oslo Accords is now extensive
and exhaustive. An especially egregious violation concerns persistent PLO/PA
refusal to comply with Israeli Government requests for transfer of terror suspects
(many of whom are now serving in the Palestinian Security Forces). The Interim
Agreement (Oslo II) states that Israel may request from the Palestinian Authority
(PA) the transfer ("extradition") of any individual located in the autonomous
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Israel's survival. If further evidence is needed of the plausibility of
this scenario, one need only recall that although Gaza and certain
portions of Judea/Samaria already under Palestinian control do not
yet fall under Palestinian sovereign authority, Israel has not had
effective capacity since Oslo to combat violence and terrorism from
these areas.
It follows from all this that Israel should take little comfort
from the legal promise of Palestinian demilitarization,41 and that
such a promise would pose absolutely no problems for Yasir
Arafat. Indeed, should the government of the new Palestinian state
choose to invite foreign armies or terrorists on to its territory
(possibly after the original government authority had been
displaced or overthrown by more militantly Islamic anti-Israel
forces), it could do so not only without practical difficulties but also
without necessarily violating international law. Ironically, if the
original PA/Fatah government of Palestine saw itself threatened by
aggression4 2 from outside Arab forces, demilitarization could even
produce a Palestinian invitation to Israel, an invitation to protect
Palestine from mutual enemies.
The prospect of such an invitation is not as strange as it seems.
And as acceptance would likely be seen to be in Israel's own best
interests, Jerusalem's requested military involvement in Palestine
could surely happen. Significantly, this involvement could bring
areas who is suspected of an offense that falls under Israeli criminal jurisdiction
(Annex IV, Art. 2., Par. 7b). The PA is obligated to comply with all formal
requests and to arrest and transfer the suspect to Israel (Annex IV, Art. 2., par.
7f(1)). On March 31, 1997, Israel submitted a total of 31 formal requests to the
PA for the transfer of terror suspects, including eleven new requests and twenty
requests that had been submitted previously. The PA did not respond to a single
Israeli request, except for two cases in December 1994, when the PA explicitly
rejected Israel's requests. See Communication by the Israel Government Press
Office, May 13, 1997; in imra@netvision.net.il. For more informed and authorita-
tive inventories of PLO/PA violations, see Incitement to Violence Against Israel by
Palestinian Officials, Israel Foreign Ministry, reprinted in THE MACCABEAN, Vol.
5., No. 5., 27-29; Palestinian Violations of the 'Interim Agreement,' THE MACCA-
BEAN, Vol. 4., No. 12, 12-15; and Dan Nimrod, Arafat's Non-Compliance with the
Oslo Accords, THE MACCABEAN, Vol. 5., No. 4., 25-32.
41. A related demilitarization issue concerns disposition of the Golan. Israel
could decide to return the strategically important heights on condition of Syrian
demilitarization. Here the legal meaning of "demilitarization" would be more
traditional than in its use regarding concessions by a still-nonexistent state (Pales-
tine), but the consequences of a Golan demilitarization could be no less injurious
to Israel.
42. See RESOLUTION ON THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, U.N. GAOR
3314, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) reprinted in 13
I.L.M. 710 (1974).
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Israel into a much wider and potentially catastrophic war, into
exactly the intolerably dangerous kinds of conditions that a
demilitarized Palestinian state was intended to prevent in the first
place. That such an outcome could be the result of an Israeli
attempt to stabilize a new and demilitarized Arab neighbor would
add yet another irony to tragedy, a tragedy based in part upon
misunderstanding of pertinent international law.
Of course, the overriding danger to Israel of Palestinian
demilitarization, more practical than jurisprudential, would stem
from Israel's self-inflicted abrogation of its own essential security
role. In the final analysis, this Oslo-driven abrogation derives from
a profound and possibly wilful misunderstanding of Palestinian
goals and expectations. While Israeli supporters of Oslo II
continue to believe in a "Two State Solution"43 and in an associat-
ed mutuality of interest in coexistence, the PA has other beliefs.'
Significantly, these beliefs, which are essentially genocidal45 with
respect to Israel, are often stated openly and unambiguously.
Here are some pertinent examples of statements by Palestinian
officials that are not only in obvious violation of the Oslo Accords,
43. Regarding the one-sided acceptance of a "Two State Solution," the
Palestinian Minister of Justice, Freh Abu Medejn - in a May 1997 televised
statement - spoke in support of killing Israeli Arabs who sell land to Jews. What
this reveals, prima facie, is that the PLO/PA openly considers Israel as part of
"Palestine."
44. Here it is relevant to note that the Palestinian National Covenant was
adopted in 1964 - three years before the Six Day War. Hence, the PLO's guiding
document was first published, with all of its references to the annihilation of Israel,
three years before Israel even came into possession of the so-called "occupied
territories." This means that the Israel the PLO seeks to destroy was and still
remains Green Line Israel.
45. The PLO is obligated under Oslo and the Wye River Memorandum to
cancel the articles in its Covenant calling for the annihilation of Israel. Yet, even
after Wye River, there is evidence that this abrogation has not taken place. At its
meeting on April 24, 1996, the only resolutions passed were about "amending the
National Covenant by cancelling the articles that contradict the exchange of letters
between the PLO and the Israeli Government on 9 and 10 September 1993." What
the resolutions accomplished is as follows: "The Palestinian National Council
charges the legal committee with redrafting the National Covenant and bringing
the new text to the central council at its first meeting." No redrafting has ever
taken place, and no text delivered to the central council. See Yehoshua Porat, The
Covenant Was Not Canceled, MA'ARIV, B7 (May 7, 1997). Moreover, what the
PLO Covenant says in words the official PLO map of "Palestine" says in symbols.
This map - which includes the area of the entire State of Israel - is not only an
explicit rejection of Oslo expectations, but also an implicit incitement to genocide.
According to the map and description taken from the Welcome to Palestine Home
Page on the World Wide Web: "Palestine, currently under occupation, is located
on the East coast of the Mediterranean Sea, West of Jordan and to the South of
Lebanon." http://www.palestine-net.com/geography/gifs/palmap.gif.
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but are also illustrative of sentiments which exclude mutuality of
interest in peace with Israel:
O our beautiful land imprisoned in a cage and surrounded by
wolves, My shaded garden, the tormentors have destroyed you,
and the dogs have settled in you, 0 Jerusalem, 0 my city, With
my notebook and pencil and the fire of my rifle I will shatter
the cage, I will kill the wolves and plant the flag, The dogs will
not bark in the heroic cities.'
I now see the walls of Jerusalem, the mosques of Jerusalem, the
churches of Jerusalem. My brothers! With blood and with
spirit we will redeem you, Palestine! Yes, with blood and with
spirit we will redeem you, Palestine!47
Israel is attempting to obstruct peace. If Israel continues to
succeed in this approach, then she is destroying the peace
process. The only option remaining for us will be an alternative
option .... war. Allow me to say that it takes only one side to
start a war. At the end of the path on which Israel is proceed-
ing, a declaration of war awaits.'
We shall always stand against them, threaten their future, and
not permit them to expand. We shall stand with all our might
against any attempted settlement effort. If they do not
implement the agreement, we shall determine what the essential
locations are in each settlement, and we will turn the lives of
the settlers into hell.49
All options are open for defending the land of the Palestinian
people."
The Zionist entity exists on seized land. The Jews remain
enemies because they expropriate lands, build settlements and
46. Poem read on the Voice of Palestine, official radio station of the
Palestinian Authority, on May 22, 1997, during the morning news program "A
New Day." It was read as part of a series of "Songs of the Homeland." The same
poem was read on the Voice of Palestine during the September 1996 riots, in
which 85 Israelis and Palestinian Arabs were killed.
47. PA Chairman Yasser Arafat, addressing a crowd in Tulkarem; Voice of
Palestine, Apr. 28, 1997.
48. PA Minister for Jerusalem Affairs Feisal Husseini; in a newspaper
interview (AL-ITTIHAD) on May 18, 1997.
49. Imad Mazen Izz al-Din, the PA's Political Instructor for National
Guidance (AL-HAYAT AL-JADEEDA, Apr. 30, 1997.
50. PA Planning Minister Nabil Shaath, at a forum in Khan Yunis (AL-HAYAT
AL-JADEEDA, Apr. 30, 1997).
IMPLICATIONS OF PALESTINIAN STATE
pay high sums to buy properties. They are the greatest enemies
of us Muslims. 1
The struggle we are waging is an ideological struggle and the
question is: where has the Islamic land of Palestine gone?
Where is Haifa and Jaffa, Lod and Ramle, Acre, Safed and
Tiberias? Where is Hebron and Jerusalem?
52
We did not pay with the dear blood of thousands of martyrs so
that the Israeli government could establish settlements on our
land in the name of peace. We have sacrificed in the past and
we will be ready to sacrifice again in the future for the sake of
liberating our land and returning it to the bosom of the
Palestinian nation and for the sake of establishing an indepen-
dent Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem.53
In the strict Islamic view, the Jewish State is always the
individual Jew in macrocosm. This Jewish State must be despised
because of this relationship, because of the allegedly innate "evil"
of the individual Jew. This is a far cry from the view that Jews
should be despised because they are associated with the State of
Israel. Exactly the opposite view prevails. Hence, the Israeli must
be despised not because he is an "occupier" or because of his
"expansionist" policies (these traits are seen as merely epipheno-
menal), but because he is a Jew. Period!
In an article published in al-Ahram, on September 27, 1982,
Dr. Lufti Abd al-Azim wrote: "The first thing that we have to
make clear is that no distinction must be made between the Jew
and the Israeli, which they themselves deny. The Jew is a Jew,
through the millennia .... in spurning all moral values, devouring
the living and drinking his blood for the sake of a few coins. The
Jew, the Merchant of Venice, does not differ from the killer of
Deir Yasin or the killer of the camps. They are equal examples of
human degradation. Let us therefore put aside such distinctions,
and talk about Jews., 54
51. PA Mufti Ikrama Sabri in an interview with N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1997.
52. Yusuf Abu Sneineh, preacher at Al-Aqsa Mosque, Friday prayer sermon;
Voice of Palestine, May 23, 1997.
53. From statement issued by the PA cabinet in Nablus on May 16, 1997
(Voice of Palestine, May 17, 1997). All of the above quotations are also cited by
a May 29, 1997 communication from the Israel Government Press Office, "Senior
Palestinian Officials Continue to Incite Against Israel in Violation of Oslo," imra-
@netvision.net.il.
54. See Bernard Lewis, SEMITES AND ANTISEMITEs: AN INQUIRY INTO
CONFLICT AND PREJUDICE, p. 195 (1999).
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In an Egyptian textbook of "Arab Islamic history," used in
teacher training colleges, we may discover the following: "The
Jews are always the same, every time and everywhere. They will
not live save in darkness. They contrive their evils clandestinely.
They fight only when they are hidden, because they are cow-
ards .... The Prophet enlightened us about the right way to treat
them, and succeeded finally in crushing the plots that they had
planned. We today must follow this way and purify Palestine from
their filth."55
Ayatollah Khomeini, in the Foreword to his book on Islamic
Government, remarked: "The Islamic Movement was afflicted by
the Jews from its very beginnings, when they began their hostile
activity by distorting the reputation of Islam, and by defaming and
maligning it. This has continued to the present day."56 And
again, on the "Zionist Problem" as a mere manifestation of the
underlying "Jewish Problem," Dr. Yahya al-Rakhawi remarked on
July 19, 1982, in al-Ahram: ". . . we are all - once again - face to
face with the Jewish Problem, not just the Zionist Problem; and we
must reassess all those studies which make a distinction between
"the Jew" and "the Israeli" ..... and we must redefine the meaning
of the word "Jew," so that we do not imagine that we are speaking
of a divinely revealed religion or a minority persecuted by
mankind. Every word has an origin, a development and a history,
and it seems that the word "Jew" has changed its content and
meaning. We thus find ourselves face to face with the essence of
a problem which has recently donned the gown of religion and
concentrated itself on a piece of land. In this confrontation, we
cannot help but see before us the figure of the great man Hitler,
may God have mercy on him, who was the wisest of those who
confronted this problem .... and who, out of compassion for
humanity, tried to exterminate every Jew, but despaired of curing
this cancerous growth on the body of mankind."57
Conventional wisdom often maintains that PLO/PA opposes
Hamas, and that the two organizations are entirely separate and
discrete. This "wisdom," however, is contradicted by considerable
available evidence. According to the September 1995 PLO/Hamas
Understanding, Hamas commits itself to refrain from terrorism only
in PLO/PA controlled areas. Arafat, in turn, recognizes Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and DFLP as legitimate, reaffirming the
55. See id., at 218-219.
56. Id.
57. See id., at 231-232.
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predominance of inter-Palestinian solidarity over PLO/PA Israel
relations.58
According to the Charter of Hamas: "Peace initiatives, the so-
called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to
resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of
the Islamic Resistance Movement. For renouncing any part of
Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the nationalism of
the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its faith, the movement
educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the
banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their Jihad59 -
.... There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by
Jihad .... In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the
Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of Jihad .... We
must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the
Palestinian problem is a religious one, to be dealt with on this
premise ... ." I swear by that (sic) who holds in His Hands the
Soul of Muhammad! I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of
Allah! I will assault and kill! assault and kill, assault and kill
,,60
58. See Yoram Ettinger, The PLO-Hamas Connection, JEWISH POL. CHRON.,
17(Mar./Apr. 1996). See also Oct. 14, 1998 interview with Farouq Qadoumi, Head
of the PLO's Political Bureau (and frequently mentioned possible successor to
Arafat) in the PA daily, Al-Hayat. Here, Qadoumi commented on Hamas/PLO
relations, saying that the Hamas Movement was a part of the Palestinian National
Movement, and that its differences with the PLO were of a "tactical rather than
a strategic nature." See MEMRI, The Middle East Media and Research Institute,
Special Dispatch, No. 8. Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 1998).
59. Jihad, or holy war, is discussed authoritatively by ROBERT S. WISTRICH,
ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991),
especially Chapter 16 ("Conspiracies and Holy Wars"). For fundamentalist
Muslims, says Wistrich, "... peace with Israel was and still remains nothing less
than a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam, a symptom of its profound
malaise, weakness and decadence." Id. at 227. According to Islamic orthodoxy,
the Prophet is said to have predicted a final war to annihilate the Jews. See D.F.
GREEN, ED., ARAB THEOLOGIANS ON JEWS AND ISRAEL: EXTRACTS FROM THE
PROCEEDING OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF THE ACADEMY OF ISLAMIC
RESEARCH, 9 (Geneva: 1976) (cited in WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM, at 230).
Mohammed, it is reported, had stated: "The hour (i.e., salvation) will not come
until you fight against the Jews; and the stone would say, '0 Muslim! There is a
Jew behind me: come and kill him.' (GREEN, at 51; WISTRICH, at 230).
60. See THE CHARTER OF ALLAH: THE PLATFORM OF THE ISLAMIC RESIS-
TANCE MOVEMENT (HAMAS) (tr. by Raphael Israeli, Harry Truman Research
Institute, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), ISRAEL AFFAIRS, Vol. 2., No. 1.,
273-293 (Autumn 1995). Hamas is the acronym for the Islamic Resistance
Movement - Harakat Muqawama Islamiyya - meaning literally, "enthusiasm,"
"zeal," "fanaticism." The quoted references concerning the Hamas imperative to
"assault and Kill" Jews is taken from Bukhari and Muslim, authors of the two
most authoritative and widely accepted collections of Hadith (traditions of the
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Regarding relationships with the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO), the Hamas Charter instructs: "The PLO is among
the closest to the Hamas, for it constitutes a father, a brother, a
relative, a friend. Can a Muslim turn away from his father, his
brother, his relative or his friend? Our homeland is one, our
calamity is one, our destiny is one and our enemy is common to
both of us . . ,,61 Finally, on the primacy of hatred toward Jews,
not Israel, the Hamas Charter states as follows: "Israel, by virtue
of its being Jewish and of having a Jewish population, defies Islam
and the Muslims. 'Let the eyes of the cowards not fall asleep.'
' 62
Both Palestinian organizations are now preparing for war
against Israel, and war need not be exclusive of genocide under
international law. Rather, war may be the means whereby
genocide is efficiently operationalized. According to Articles II and
III of the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on
January 12, 1951, genocide includes any of several listed acts that
are "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such .... ,,63 This
means that where Israel is recognized as the institutionalized
expression of the Jewish People (an expression that includes
national, ethnical, racial and religious components), acts of war
intended to destroy the Jewish State could assuredly be genocidal.
The internet website of Yasir Arafat's Fatah Movement recently
released a constitution that calls openly for the "eradication" of
Israel.'
The Genocide Convention criminalizes not only the various
stipulated acts of genocide, but also (Article III) conspiracy to
commit genocide and direct and public incitement to commit
genocide. Articles II, III and IV of the Genocide Convention are
fully applicable in all cases of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide. For the Convention to be invoked, it is sufficient
that any one of the State parties call for a meeting, through the
United Nations, of all the State parties (Article VIII). Although
this has never actually been done, the United States should
consider very seriously taking this step while there is still time.
Prophet).
61. Id. at 287.
62. Id. at 288.
63. See CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME
OF GENOCIDE, Done at New York, Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force, 78 U.N.T.S.
(277 Jan. 12, 1951).
64. See www.fatah.org.
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Israel, too, should be an obvious co-participant in this call, but it is
hardly likely that a Government that does not even insist upon its
basic rights under Oslo65 will now seek redress under much
broader multilateral conventions.
The Genocide Convention is not the only authoritative
criminalization that should be invoked against ongoing and illegal
Palestinian calls for mass murder of Jews. The 1965 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion could also be brought productively into play. This treaty
condemns "all propaganda and all organizations which attempt to
justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form,"
obliging - at Article 4(a) - State parties to declare as "an offense
punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as
all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or
group of persons." Article 4(b) affirms that State parties "Shall
declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and
all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organiza-
tions or activities as an offense punishable by law." Further
authority for curtailing and punishing Yasir Arafat's and other
Palestinian calls for genocidal destruction of Jews66 can be found
at Article 20 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
65. In this connection, there is a corollary failure on the part of the
Government of the United States. As of April 2, 1999, at least seven terrorists
responsible for killing Americans were free in PA territory. They are: (1) Ibrahim
Ghneimat, member of the Tzurif terror cell; (2) Nafez Mahmoud Sabih, involved
in planning attacks that killed American citizens Matthew Eisenfeld, Sara Duker
and Ira Weinstein; (3) Mohammad Dief, senior Hamas terrorist responsible, inter
alia, for kidnap/murder of Nachshon Wachsman, a dual American-Israeli citizen;
(4) Nasser Mahmoud Hindawi, Islamic Jihad terrorist involved in the April 9,
1995, suicide bomb attack near Kfar Darom, in which seven Israelis and American
Alisa Flatow were killed; (5) Hassan Said Hamadan, Islamic Jihad terrorist
involved in the Kfar Darom attack; (6) Yusuf Samiri, Islamic Jihad terrorist
involved in the Kfar Darom attack; and (7) Adnan Mahmoud al-Ghol, Islamic
Jihad terrorist involved in Kfar Darom attack. See Israel Government Press
Office, Seven Terrorists Involved in Killing Americans Are Free in PA Territory;
Three Are In Detention," THE JEWISH PRESS, 12 (Apr. 2, 1999).
66. Technically, such calls qualify Arafat and certain other Palestinian leaders
as Hostes humani generis, or "Common enemies of humankind." See Harvard
Research in International Law: Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 566 (Supp. 1935) (quoting Coke, C.J. in King v.
Marsh, 3 Bulstr. 27, 81 E.R. 23 (1615) ("a pirate est hostes humani generis")).
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hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law."
At its heart, the problem of Israel's survival now lies in the
Jewish State's basic assumptions concerning war, peace and
genocide. While Israel's regional enemies, including PLO/PA and
Hamas, believe that any power gains for Israel represent a power
loss for them - that is, that they coexist with Israel in a condition
of pure conflict - Israel assumes something else. For Israel,
relations with Arab/Islamic states and organizations are not, as
these enemies believe, zero-sum relations. Rather, they are a
mutual-dependence connection, a nonzero-sum relation where
conflict is mixed with cooperation. Israel, unlike its enemies,
believes that any gain for these enemies is not necessarily a loss for
itself. Indeed, since Oslo, Israel is unwilling even to identify its
enemies as enemies.
Israel believes that its enemies also reject zero-sum assump-
tions about the strategy of conflict. Israel's enemies, however, do
not make such erroneous judgments about conformance with Israeli
calculations. These enemies know that Israel is wrong in its belief
that Arab/Islamic states and organizations also reject the zero-sum
assumption, but they pretend otherwise. There is, therefore, a
dramatic and most serious disparity between Israel and its multiple
enemies. Israel's strategy of conflict is founded upon miscalcula-
tions and false assumptions, and upon an extraordinary unaware-
ness of, or indifference to, enemy manipulations. The pertinent
strategic policies of Israel's enemies, on the other hand, are
grounded upon correct calculations and assumptions, and upon an
astute awareness of Israeli errors.
What does all of this mean, for the demilitarization "remedy"
and for Israeli security in general? Above all, it positively demands
that Israel make far-reaching changes in the manner in which it
conceptualizes the continuum of cooperation and conflict. Israel,
ridding itself of wishful thinking, of always hoping, hoping too
much, should immediately recognize the zero-sum calculations of
its enemies, and should begin to recognize itself that the struggle
in the Middle East must still be fought overwhelmingly at the
conflict end of the continuum. The struggle, in other words, must
be fought, however reluctantly and painfully, in zero-sum terms.
Israel should immediately acknowledge that its support for
Oslo is fully inconsistent with both the zero-sum calculations of its
enemies and with its own newly-recognized imperative to relate on
the basis of zero-sum assumptions. By continuing to sustain Oslo,
Israel, in effect, rejects correct zero-sum notions of Middle East
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conflict and accepts the starkly incorrect idea that its enemies also
reject these notions. By rejecting Oslo, Israel would accept correct
zero-sum notions of Middle East conflict and accept the correct
idea that its enemies base their policies upon exactly these notions.
By such rejection, Israel would also be acting in support of
international law.
Enemy commitments to zero-sum notions of conflict with Israel
are augmented by the Jewish State's overwhelming military
liabilities. With only a dozen air bases that can handle aircraft, and
with Syria now deploying hundreds of advanced SCUDs which
could hit these bases and Israeli mobilization centers early during
war - Israel's capacity for self-defense is seriously limited. Even
Israel's vaunted armor corps has only 2210 tanks of high-quality.
The IDF still maintains forty-year old Centurions, antique M-48s
and captured Russian T-62s.67
A good summary of Israel's current overall military condi-
tion/preparedness is offered by Morris J. Amitay:
Israel's "huge army" has been holding steady at 187,000, and it
is still basically a citizens army with 444,000 reserves. The
number of divisions, 16, has been the same since 1993.
Meanwhile, Israel's potential foes have not been sitting still -
and some - particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt - are increas-
ingly getting more top of the line U.S. equipment. The
numbers help to tell the story. Egypt counts 440,000 regular
troops and 254,000 reserves, along with 3390 tanks and 505
aircraft to Israel's 613 planes. Iraq numbers 382,000 regular,
650,000 reserves, 2700 tanks and 330 aircraft. Iran's 750,000
troops are less important than its long-range missiles which can
hit Israel. Syria has 421,000 regulars, 500,000 reserves, 4600
tanks and 520 aircraft, and Saudi Arabia with 105,000 regulars,
57,000 reserves and 1055 tanks has 322 modern aircraft -
including over 100 F-15s. Besides the recently announced U.S.
arms sales to Egypt, openly-hostile Syria will soon be re-armed
with the latest Russian S-300 air defense system, SU-27 fighter
bombers and T-80 tanks, and it has been amassing a large
arsenal of ground to ground missiles. Iraq has now been more
than eight months without even non-intrusive inspections. And
no one thinks that Saddam has been busy in the meantime with
public works and welfare projects. The Saudis, thankfully, had
to cut back on buying the latest American weapons because of
67. See Morris J. Amitay, Israel's Alleged Military Superiority, THE MACCA-
BEAN, Vol. 7., No. 4., Houston, Texas, Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, 22
(May 1999).
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lower oil prices, but they will soon be getting U.S. AMRAAM
long-range air to air missiles. Iran is devoting much of its
resources to acquiring long-range missiles and nuclear weapons,
not only with Russia's help - but also with Chinese and North
Korean aid. As for Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, the CIA
has been saying 5-10 years - but it seems they have been saying
this the last 5 - 10 years.'
In confronting these military threats, Israel should also now
remind the world about the authentic history of "Palestine." It
should remind the world that a sovereign state of Palestine did not
exist before 1967 or 1948; that a state of Palestine was not
promised by authoritative U.N. Security Council Resolution # 242;
that, indeed, a state of Palestine had never existed. As a nonstate
legal entity, Palestine ceased to exist in 1948, when Great Britain
relinquished its League of Nations mandate. When during the
1948-49 War of Independence,6 9 Judea/Samaria and Gaza came
under the illegal control of Jordan and Egypt respectively, these
aggressor states did not put an end to an already-existing state.
From the Biblical Period (ca. 1350 BCE to 586 BCE) to the
British Mandate (1918-1948), the land named by the Romans after
the ancient Philistines (a naming intended to punish and to demean
the Jews) was controlled exclusively by non-Palestinian elements.
Significantly, however, a continuous chain of Jewish possession of
the land was legally recognized after World War I at the San Remo
Conference of April 1920. There, a binding treaty was signed in
which Great Britain was granted mandatory authority over
Palestine (the area had been ruled by the Ottoman Turks since
68. Id. at 22.
69. Regarding this first war, on February 16, 1948, the U.N. Palestine Commis-
sion reported to the Security Council: "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and
outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are
engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."
U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 2., at 10, U.N. Doc. Supp. (1948). The Arabs
themselves were unambiguous in accepting responsibility for starting the war.
Jamal Husseini informed the Security Council on April 16, 1948: "The represen-
tatives of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday they were not the attackers; that the
Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world
that we were going to fight." (See U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess, 283d mtg. at 19 (1948).
The British commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, Lieutenant General John Bagot
Glubb, remarked candidly: "Early in January, the first detachments of the Arab
Liberation Army began to infiltrate into Palestine from Syria. Some came through
Jordan and even through Amman .... They were, in reality, to strike the first
blow in the ruin of the Arabs of Palestine." JOHN BAGOT GLUBB, A SOLDIER
WITH THE ARABS, 79 (1957) (cited in Louis Rene Beres, Response to Quigley, AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, Vol. 12, No. 3., 511 (1997)).
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1516) to prepare it to become the "national home for the Jewish
People." Palestine, according to the treaty, comprised lands
encompassing what are now the states of Jordan and Israel,
including Judea/Samaria and Gaza. Present day Israel, including
Judea/Samaria and Gaza, comprises only twenty-two percent of
Palestine as defined and ratified at the San Remo Peace Conference.
In 1922, Great Britain unilaterally and illegally split off 78
percent of the lands promised to the Jews - all of Palestine east of
the Jordan River - and gave them to Abdullah, the non-Palestinian
son of the Sharif of Mecca. Eastern Palestine now took the name
Transjordan, which it retained until April 1949, when it was
renamed as Jordan. From the first moment of its creation,
Transjordan was closed to all Jewish migration and settlement, a
clear betrayal of the British promise in the Balfour Declaration of
1917 and a contravention of its Mandatory obligations.
On July 20, 1951, a Palestinian assassinated King Abdullah for
his hostility to Palestinian nationalist aspirations. Several years
prior to Abdullah's killing, in 1947, the newly-formed United
Nations, rather than designate the entire land west of the Jordan
River as the Jewish National Homeland, enacted a second partition.
Ironically, because this second fission again gave unfair advantage
to the Arabs, Jewish leaders accepted the painful judgment while
the Arab states did not. On May 15, 1948, exactly one day after
the State of Israel came into existence, Azzam Pasha, Secretary
General of the Arab League, declared to the new tiny nation
founded upon ashes of the Holocaust: "This will be a war of
extermination and a momentous massacre . . . ." This declaration,
as we have just seen, remains at the very heart of all Arab policies
toward Israel.7"
In 1967, almost twenty years after Israel's entry into the
community of nations, the Jewish State - as a result of its stunning
military victory over Arab aggressor states - gained unintended
70. Significantly, this attitude was oriented toward Jews generally during the
Holocaust. Haj Amin al Husaini, the most influential leader of Palestinian Arabs,
lived in Nazi Germany during World War II. On several occasions he met
personally with Hitler, Ribbentrop and others to coordinate Nazi and Arab poli-
cies toward Jews and the Middle East. For the exact record of the conversation
between Adolph Hitler and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941,
in Berlin, see: Adolph Hitler, Zionism and the Arab Cause, WALTER LAQUEUR
AND BARRY RUBIN, EDS., THE ISRAEL - ARAB READER: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT (Penguin Books) (1995), Fifth Ed., pp.
68-72. The text is drawn from DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1918-
45, Series D., Vol. XIII, London, 1964, pp. 881 ff.
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control over Judea/Samaria and Gaza. Although the idea of the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war is enshrined in
the U.N. Charter, there existed no authoritative sovereign to whom
the territories could be "returned." Israel could hardly have been
expected to transfer these territories back to Jordan and Egypt,
which had exercised unauthorized and cruel control since the Arab-
initiated war of extermination in 1948-1949. Moreover, the idea of
Palestinian "self-determination" was only just beginning to emerge
after the Six Day War, and was not even codified in U.N. Security
Council Resolution #242, which was adopted on November 22,
1967.71 For their part, the Arab states convened a summit in
Khartoum, in August 1967, which concluded with the cry: "No
peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it
We have come full circle. A Palestinian state is now being
erected by an authority that will ultimately brook no serious form
of demilitarization and that will reject altogether a two-state
solution. The Palestinian Authority is committed to a strategy
founded upon unhindered control over the instruments of violence.
This means that if Israeli government leaders prepare to accept the
Oslo-driven Palestinian state because such a state would presum-
ably be demilitarized, they would be making an uninformed and
fatal mistake.
Although Security Council Resolution 242 links the establish-
ment of peace with Israeli withdrawal from the territories, no
insistence on direct negotiations among the hostile parties is
mandated by the text. Resolution 242 does not require Israel to
withdraw from each of the territories it came to control in 1967-
control stemming not from a war of aggression (the sort of control
deemed inadmissible in the preamble to 242)-but from a legiti-
71. For text of SC Resolution 242, see: Security Council Resolution on the
Middle East (Nov. 22, 1967), WALTER LAQUEUR AND BARRY RUBIN, EDS., THE
ISRAEL-ARAB READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST
CONFLICT, 217-218 (Penguin Books) (1995). In late Spring 1999, the Palestine
Authority began to base its claims for statehood more on the UN Partition
Resolution of 1947 (# 181) and the Resolution calling for the "right of return" for
Palestinian refugees (#194). Also disregarded currently is UN Security Council
Resolution 338 (Oct. 22, 1973) (see Laqueur and Rubin, supra, at 310). The UN
Human Rights Commission in Geneva even passed a resolution, on April 27, 1999,
calling for Palestinian self-determination on the basis of #s 181 and 194. This new
focus represents an attempt to shrink Israel to an area smaller than even its 1967
borders. See David Makovsky, Israel Fails to Block UN Vote on Partition and
Right of Return, HA'ARETZ, (Apr. 28, 1999), reprinted in THE MACCABEAN, Vol.
7., No. 4., 7 (May 1999).
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mate war of self-defense. When, in 1979, Egypt made peace with
Israel, it received the whole of the Sinai in return, land constituting
over 90 percent of the territory taken by Israel in 1967.
Resolution 242 has been generally misinterpreted. The
formula envisioned by the Resolution is one of "peace for land,"
not "land for peace." The Resolution grants to every state in the
Middle East "the right to live in peace within secure and recog-
nized boundaries." It point, therefore, to peace before territorial
withdrawal to "recognized boundaries."
The 1978 Camp David Accords stipulated that negotiations on
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip must address the
"legitimate rights" of its Arab inhabitants. But these legitimate
rights do not include the right to establish another Arab
state-especially as that state would likely be established upon the
intended ruins of the State of Israel.
Security Council Resolution 242 is "a balanced whole,"
according to Lord Caradon of Great Britain, its sponsor. "To add
to it, or to detract from it would destroy the balance .... It must
be considered as a whole and as it stands." Considering the text,
the "right of self-determination of the Palestinians" does not
appear in the Resolution; an international conference is never
mentioned; the parties referred to include only states; and the
phrase "territories occupied" is neither preceded by "the," nor is
it followed by "on all fronts." Finally, 242 specifically mentions
withdrawal only of Israel's armed forces, not its administrative
apparatus or sovereign control.
Israel's current (albeit unexercised) right to reject the idea of
the territories as "occupied" also stems from its incontrovertible
right to security. Because transformation of these lands into an
Arab state of Palestine would threaten the very existence of the
Third Temple, Israel is under no obligation to transfer West Bank
and Gaza to another sovereign authority, especially as the extant
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Arab states, together with Iran,72 persistently call for "elimination"
or "liquidation" of the "Zionist entity."
IV. Palestine and Israel's Nuclear Strategy
Now, let us return to the question of Palestine and Israeli
reliance on nuclear deterrence. What are the forms such expanded
reliance might take? A number of possibilities come immediately
to mind. First, it is likely that Israel, feeling more threatened by its
72. Iran is now a particularly great danger to Israel. This is the case because
that revolutionary Islamic state displays both the requisite capabilities (including
unconventional weapons) and intentions vis-A-vis the Jewish State. Regarding
capabilities, a number of authoritative sources state that Iran already has in place
a number of nuclear weapons and is now acquiring new delivery systems ranging
from ballistic missiles to nuclear-capable artillery. See Task Force on Terrorism
and Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House
of Representatives Iran's Nuclear Weapons: Update II, (Apr. 30, 1992). See also
The Fate of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union, CARNEGIE Q., Vol.
XXXVII/Nos. 1, 2, 15 (Winter/Spring 1992); see also PROLIFERATION WATCH,
Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan./Feb. 1992, a publication of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Washington D.C., 12; see also ACTIVITIES TO PREVENT
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, Communication from the President of the United
States Transmitting His Annual Report Reviewing All Activities of U.S.
Government Departments and Agencies During Calendar Year 1990 Relating to
the Prevention of Nuclear Proliferation, Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3281, House
Document 102-135, (Sept. 11, 1991); see also Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary S.
Davis, IRAN'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE,
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 13
(June 28, 1992). Iran is currently receiving several billion dollars worth of arms
from North Korea, China and Czechoslovakia. In March 1992, the U.S. CIA
confirmed that Iran had spent $2 billion on arms during the single fiscal year
ending March 20, 1992. Prior arms deals were made by Iran and the Soviet Union.
Among Iran's major purchases from the USSR were two squadrons of MIG-29
combat aircraft; T-27 tanks and three diesel-powered submarines. Presently, Iran
is buying new generation weapons from Russia, which is honoring agreements
signed in June 1989, between Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mikhail
Gorbachev. See Claude van England, Iran Steps Up Arms Purchases to Prop
Military, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 1, 4 (Apr. 20, 1992). Regarding
intentions, Iran expresses an overriding obligation to destroy Israel altogether, an
obligation that is founded not in political differences (which are merely epipheno-
menal) but on a theological anti-Judaism. See, e.g. Ayatollah Khomeini's, Program
for the Establishment of an Islamic Government, 1970, which is still very much
valid today: ISLAM AND REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM
KHOMEINI, Berkeley, 127 (1981); see also ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM:
THE LONGEST HATRED, 219 (Pantheon Books) (1991). As for peace with Israel,
this can be nothing less than a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam.
According to al-Da'wa (the Mission), a fundamentalist publication, the status of
the Jew, and therefore of Israel, is clear and unambiguous: "The race (sic.) is
corrupt at the root, full of duplicity, and the Muslims have everything to lose in
seeking to deal with them; they must be exterminated." GILLES KEPEL, THE
PROPHET AND PHARAOH: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN EGYPT, London, 112 (1985).
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loss of buffer territory, would feel increasingly compelled to bring
its bomb out of the "basement."73 Here, fearing that its expanded
need for a credible deterrent were no longer served by the nuclear
posture of "deliberate ambiguity," Israel would probably move to
some form of explicit declaration of nuclear capability. Such
disclosure could be full or partial and could be carried out with or
without appropriate public demonstrations or tests.
Whether or not such a shift from ambiguity to disclosure would
actually enhance Israeli deterrence would depend upon several
complex factors, including the types of weapons involved, the
reciprocal calculations of Arab and Iranian leaders,74 the effects
upon rational decision-making processes by these Arab leaders and
the effects upon both Israeli and Arab command/control/communi-
cations operations. If, for example, bringing the Israeli bomb out
of the basement were to result in Arab pre-delegations of launch
authority and/or new launch-on-warning procedures, the likelihood
of unauthorized and/or accidental wars (including in the future,
nuclear wars)75 would be increased.76
73. The question of Israel's "bomb in the basement" is the central theme of
Louis RENt BERES, ED., SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
STRATEGY (Lexington Books) (1986).
74. Regarding Iran, the public declarations of war with Israel create a legal
state of war between the two countries irrespective of the presence or absence of
ongoing hostilities between national armed forces. The principle affirming that the
existence of a legal state of war depends upon the intentions of one or more of the
states involved, and not on "objective" phenomena, is known variously as the
"state of war" doctrine, "de jure war," "war in the legal sense," and "war in the
sense of international law." See, e.g. BARRY E. CARTER AND PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1216-1218 (1991).
Moreover, Iran is effectively engaged in a protracted surrogate war with Israel,
involving actual armed conflict, via Hezbollah activities in the Bekaa. Direct
subsidies from Iran enable Hezbollah to pay its fighters and maintain the war.
(For current information on this active terror arm of Iran, which persistently and
openly affirms the path of "armed struggle," see Yosef Yaakov, Hezbollah's Rising
Threat Will Not Go Unanswered, THE JERUSALEM POST INT'L EDITION, 2 (Apr.
18, 1992).
75. There is now a huge literature that deals with the expected consequences
of a nuclear war. For works by this author. See, e.g. APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR
CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (The University of Chicago Press) (1980); see,
e.g. MIMICKING SISYPHUS: AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING NUCLEAR STRATEGY
(Lexington Books, 1983); see, e.g. REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (Lexington Books) (1984); see, e.g. SECURITY OR
ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1986).
76. See Antarctic Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. no. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
(Dec. 1,1959); Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct
Communication Link ("The Hot Line Agreement"), 14 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. No.
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It is also clear that merely acknowledging what one's adversar-
ies have already believed need not necessarily enhance Israeli
5362, 472 U.N.T.S. 163 (June 20, 1963); see also Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water ("Partial Test Ban
Treaty"), 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. no. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (Aug. 5, 1963); see
also Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Outer
Space Treaty"), 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967); see also Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America ("Treaty of Tlateloco"), 634 U.N.T.S. 326 (Feb. 14, 1967); see
also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT"), 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (opened for signature July 1, 1968); see also
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof ("Seabed Arms Control Treaty"), 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No.
7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 (opened for signature Feb. 11, 1971); see also Agreement
on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("Accident Measures
Agreement"), 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S. 57 (Sept. 30, 1971);
see also Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct
Communications Link ("Hot Line Modernization Agreement"), 22 U.S.T. 1598,
T.I.A.S. No. 7187, 806 U.N.T.S. 402 (Sept. 30, 1971); see also Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ("ABM Treaty"), 23 U.S.T. 3435,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, 944 U.N.T.S. 13 (May 26, 1972); see also Interim Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, 94 U.N.T.S. 3 (May 26, 1972); see also
Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 66 DEP'T ST. BULL. 898 (May 29,
1972); see also Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon
Tests, 71 DEP'T ST. BULL. 217 (July 12, 1974); see also Limitation on Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems Treaty Protocol, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276 (July 3, 1974); see also Joint
Statement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ("the Vladivostok
Agreement"), 70 DEP'T ST. BULL. 677 (Apr. 29, 1974); see also Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("Helsinki Accords"), DEP'T
ST. PUB. No. 8826 (Aug. 1, 1975) (Gen'l For. Pol. Ser. 298); see also Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
("Moon Treaty"), Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 Annex 11 (1979); see also
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, 24 I.L.M. 1440 (Aug. 6, 1985); see also
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles (" INF Treaty"), Dec. 8, 1987, 88 DEP'T ST. BULL. 24 (Feb. 1988). See
also the US-USSR Treaty and Protocol on Underground Nuclear Explosions for
Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, 74 DEP'T ST. BULL. 802 (1976). See also Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the SALT II Treaty, June 18, 1979, S. Exec. Doc. Y, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 37 (1979).
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deterrence. Even if Israel should move from its position of
ambiguity to disclosure (full or partial), Arab enemies of the Jewish
state might still not believe the nuclear threat. Or, perhaps even
more ominously for Israel, disclosure could prod Arab leaders to
preempt in the near term, a decision that would flow from their
presumption that (1) war with Israel is inevitable; and (2) Israel's
vulnerability to aggression will only diminish.77
77. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression. Adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly, Dec. 14, 1974, 29 U.N. GAOR 3314 (XXIX), (Supp. No. 31)
142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974). For pertinent
codifications of the criminalization of aggression; see also The 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact (Pact of Paris), Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57 (Aug.
27, 1928); see also U.N. Charter Article 2 (4), Charter of the United Nations, done
at San Francisco, entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043 (June 26, 1945.); see also the 1965 Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, 20 U.N. GAOR 2131 (XX),
(Supp. No. 14) 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014, (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374 (1966); see
also the 1970 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, 25 U.N. GAOR 2625 (XXV), (Supp. No.
28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); see also the 1972 Declaration on the Non-use
of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 27 U.N. GAOR 2936, (Supp. No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972); see also the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annex to the
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (Aug. 8,
1945); see also Resolution Affirming the Principles of International Law
Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. GAOR 95 (1), 1
U.N. GAOR at 1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946); see also Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19
(Dec. 26, 1933) (known generally as the "Montevideo Convention"); see also the
Pact of the League of Arab States, art. 5, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the
Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, chs. II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb. 27, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (March 22, 1945) (known generally as the "Protocol
of Buenos Aires"); see also the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
62 Stat. 1681., T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77 (Sept. 2, 1947) (known generally
as the "Rio Pact"); see also the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, 30
U.N.T.S. 55 (April 30, 1948) (known generally as the "Pact of Bogota"); see also
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, arts. II, III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39
(May 25, 1963). For more on aggression, see Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. Adopted by the U.N. International Law
Commission in 1954, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 150 (1954), revised in 1987, 1988 and
1989. U.N. Doc. A/42/420 (1987), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/404 (1987), U.N. Doc.
A/43/539 (1988), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 (1989), and U.N. Doc. A/44/150 (1989).
See also Declaration on the Right of.Peoples to Peace. Adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly, Nov. 12, 1984. 39 U.N. GAOR 39/11/ Annex, (Supp. No. 51)
22, U.N. Doc. A/39/L.14 (1984).
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The creation of Palestine from the territories could also affect
Israel's inclination to preempt.78  But how? One argument
suggests that because of Israel's diminished size, its inclination to
strike first at enemy hard targets would be especially high. After
all, now deprived of strategic depth, it could not hold out for as
long as was possible when Palestine was still the territories. In this
connection, it is possible that a shift from deliberate ambiguity to
disclosure after Palestine came into existence would reduce the
Israeli incentive to preempt, but only if Jerusalem were made to
believe that its nuclear threat, as a result of this shift, were being
taken more seriously by the Arabs.
79
78. Pre-emption has often figured importantly in Israeli strategic calculations.
This is especially apparent in the wars of 1956 and 1967, and in the destruction of
the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Significantly, it was essentially the failure to
preempt in October 1973 that contributed to heavy Israeli losses on the Egyptian
and Syrian fronts during the Yom Kippur war, and-indeed-almost brought
about Israeli defeat. Efraim Inbar has introduced a further strategic refinement
into the issue of preemption, distinguishing between a "preemptive strike" and a
"preventive strike." According to Inbar, who argues that the 1956 war was
"preventive" while the 1967 war was "preemptive," the distinction is this: "A
preventive strike is launched to destroy the potential threat of the enemy, while
a preemptive strike is launched in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression."
See Efraim Inbar, The 'No Choice War' Debate in Israel, J. STRATEGIC STUD., 35
(Mar. 1989). For more on Israel's commitment to preemption/prevention, see
Gerald M. Steinberg, The Middle East in the Missile Age, ISSUES ScI.& TECH.,
Vol. V., Number 4, 35-40 (Summer 1989); see also (MAJOR-GENERAL) AVRAHAM
TAMIR, A SOLDIER IN SEARCH OF PEACE: AN INSIDE LOOK AT ISRAEL'S
STRATEGY, (New York: Harper and Row) (1988). Recalling the fateful decision
of Golda Meir not to preempt against enemy force concentrations and other vital
targets on Yom Kippur day in 1973 (Chief of Staff Dan Elazar, Tamir reports, had
requested permission for a preemptive attack), Tamir explains the problem
correctly as one of tension between strategic requirements and political sensitivi-
ties. "The decision to strike first," he says, "is always a difficult and risky one,
involving a delicate balance between military and political factors." Nevertheless,
it is a decision that Israel, will continue to make: "A small country like Israel,
lacking in strategic depth and surrounded by enemies, can never forego the
possibility of a pre-emptive strike against an imminent threat." Id. at 197.
79. Let us recall, here, Pufendorf's argument in ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND
CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW: "... where it is quite clear that the
other is already planning an attack upon me, even though he has not yet fully
revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin forcible self-defense,
and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided there be no hope that,
when admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put off his hostile temper; or if such
admonition be likely to injure our cause. Hence, he is to be regarded as the
aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure, and prepared himself to carry it
out. But the excuse of self-defense will be his, who by quickness shall overpower
his slower assailant. And for defense, it is not required that one receive the first
blow, or merely avoid and parry those aimed at him." See SAMUEL PUFENDORF
ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW, VOL. II,
TR., BY FRANK GARDNER MOORE, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 32
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Here, several problems must be considered. First, how would
Israel's leadership actually know that taking the bomb out of the
basement had improved its deterrence posture? To a certain
extent, the credibility of Jerusalem's nuclear threats would be
contingent upon the severity of different provocations. For
example, it might be believable if Israel were to threaten nuclear
reprisals for provocations that endanger the very survival of the
Jewish state, but it would almost certainly be unbelievable to
threaten such reprisals for relatively minor territorial infringements
or incursions.8'
In view of what is now generally believed about Israel
throughout the Middle East, and-indeed-all over the world,
there is every reason to assume that Israel's nuclear arsenal does
exist, and that Israel's enemies share this assumption. The most
critical question about Israel's nuclear deterrent, therefore, is not
one of capability, but one of willingness. How likely is it that
Israel, after launching non-nuclear preemptive strikes against
enemy hard targets,81 would respond to Arab reprisals with
(1964).
80. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, Israel-intrawar threats notwith-
standing-decided not to respond to Iraq's 39 missile attacks against the Jewish
State with any sort of reprisal. Yet, if Israel had decided to respond, presumably
against Baghdad's military assets, this response could have been characterized by
Jerusalem as one of the following: (1) reprisal; (2) self-defense; or (3) anticipatory
self-defense. Alternatively, Israel could have argued persuasively that: (4) a
condition of war has existed between the Jewish State and Iraq since 1948 at Iraq's
insistence, and that Israel's latest military strikes were not measures of self-help
short of war (i.e., not instances of reprisal, self-defense or anticipatory self-
defense), but rather just one more legitimate use of force in an ongoing conflict.
In the final analysis, the lawfulness of Israel's counterstrike and the reasonableness
of its characterization would have depended upon such facts as general moves
toward peace underway in the region, amount of elapsed time between Iraq's
aggression and Israel's response and level of continuing danger to Israel from the
Baghdad regime. Significantly, if Jerusalem should have opted for number 4
(above), unless a formal peace settlement were already being negotiated between
Israel and Iraq (highly improbable) its military counterstrike would have been
prima facie lawful so long as it fulfilled the settled peremptory criteria of the laws
of war-namely, the expectations of discrimination, proportionality and military
necessity.
81. In this connection, it is conceivable, perhaps even likely, that an Israeli
non-nuclear preemption would be the best way to reduce the risk of regional
nuclear war. (This follows from the assumption that if Israel waits for its enemies
to strike first, these enemies may launch nuclear attacks, or--even if they strike
first with conventional weapons-Israel will have no choice but to resort to nuclear
retaliation.) To the extent that this is indeed the case, the reasonableness/legality
of Israeli non-nuclear preemption would be enhanced. Here, Jerusalem's commit-
ment to anticipatory self-defense would be distinctly law-enforcing. No such
defense, of course, could be mustered on behalf of an Israeli nuclear preemption,
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nuclear counterretaliation? This is perhaps the single most
important question to be raised in connection with the general issue
examined here.
To answer this question, Israel's decision-makers will have to
put themselves into the shoes of various Arab leaders. Will these
leaders calculate that they can afford to retaliate against Israel, i.e.,
that such retaliation would not produce nuclear counterretaliation?
In asking this question, they will-assume, of course, a non-nuclear
retaliation against Israel. A nuclear retaliation, should it become
technically possible, would assuredly invite a nuclear counterretalia-
tory blow.
What will they conclude? This depends, in turn, upon their
view of Arab reciprocal judgments about Israel's pertinent leaders.
Do these judgments suggest a leadership that believes it can gain
the upper-hand with nuclear counterretaliation? Or do they
suggest a leadership that believes such counterretaliation would
bring upon Israel intolerable levels of harm and destruction?
Depending upon the way in which the Arab decision-makers
interpret Israel's authoritative perceptions, they will accept or reject
the cost-effectiveness of a non-nuclear retaliation against Israel.
This means that it is in Israel's interest to communicate the
following strategic assumption to its enemies: that Israel would be
acting rationally by responding to Arab non-nuclear reprisals82 to
which would, in all circumstances, be in violation of international law. Moreover,
should Israel feel compelled to actually resort to nuclear war-fighting at some
point, either after (1) Arab reprisals for Israel's conventional preemption cause the
Jewish State to escalate to nuclear weapons; or (2) Arab chemical/biological
/conventional first-strikes cause Israel to escalate to nuclear weapons, it would
confront substantial problems under international law. Should certain Arab states
launch nuclear first-strikes against Israel, Jerusalem's retaliatory use of nuclear
weapons would be far less problematic jurisprudentially, but matters of law in such
circumstances would assuredly be moot.
82. The right of self-defense should not be confused with reprisal. Although
both are commonly known as measures of self-help short of war, an essential
difference lies in their respective purpose. Taking place after the harm has already
been experienced, reprisals are punitive in character and cannot be undertaken for
protection. Self-defense, on the other hand, is by its very nature intended to
mitigate harm. The problem of reprisal as a rationale for the permissible use of
force by states is identified in the U.N. Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States: "States have
a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." See U.N.
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 24,
1970. 25 U.N. GAOR 2625 (XXV), (Supp. No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). For the most part, the prohibition of reprisal
can be deduced from the broad regulation of force found at Article 2(4), the
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Israeli preemptive attacks with nuclear counterretaliation. The
plausibility of this assumption would be enhanced considerably if
Arab reprisals were to involve chemical and/or biological weap-
ons.
83
All of these calculations, of course, assume rationality.' In
the absence of-calculations ,that compare the costs and benefits of
strategic alternatives, what will happen in the Middle East is only
a matter of conjecture. Significantly, the prospect of non-rational
judgments in the region is increasingly likely, especially as the
influence of Islamic fundamentalism 85 spreads to Arab leadership
elites. 86 To the extent that Israel might one day believe itself
obligation to settle disputes peacefully at Article 2(3) and the general limiting of
permissible force by states to self-defense.
83. The prospect of such reprisals calls to mind the laws of war. Today, the
laws of war, the rules of jus in bello, comprise: (1) laws on weapons; (2) laws on
warfare; and (3) humanitarian rules. Codified primarily at the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, and known thereby as the law of the Hague and the law of Geneva,
these rules attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality and military necessity
into belligerent calculations. On the main corpus of jus in bello, see: Convention
No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of
Regulations, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (Oct. 8, 1907) (known
commonly as the "Hague Regulations"); see also Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Done
at Geneva, Entered into force, Oct. 21, 1950. 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Aug. 12, 1949); see also Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Entered into force, Oct. 21, 1950. 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 (done at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949.); see also Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Entered into force, Oct. 21, 1950. 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (done at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949); see also
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Entered into force, Oct. 21, 1950. 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 (done at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949).
84. The rational actor is defined as a unitary, value-maximizing decision-maker
with one set of specified goals, one set of perceived options and a single estimate
of the consequences that ensue from each alternative.
85. Islam has historically sought to establish a world public order based on
divine legislation and to enforce it by the jihad. The jihad is the Islamic bellum
justum and is the very basis of Islam's relationships with other nations. For an
authoritative study of Islam and international law, see: SHATBANI'S SIYAR: THE
ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS, tr. with an introduction, by Majid Khadduri (The
Johns Hopkins Press) (1966).
86. Throughout the Islamic world, fundamentalists are challenging incumbent
regimes, competing for power and calling for a new assertiveness. Unlike more
moderate Moslems, these fundamentalists are disinterested in political compromise
and are willing, in many cases, to place the obligations of "submission" (Islam in
Arabic means submission to the will of God) above the requirements of personal
or collective survival. Moreover, their power grows daily as a number of Arab
states are increasingly unable to surmount substantial social, medical and economic
problems. In Egypt, the palpable reassertion of Muslim piety is directed toward
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confronted with nonrational enemies, particularly ones with highly
destructive weapons in their arsenals, its incentive to preempt
would become overwhelming. In fact, should such enemies be
believed to hold nuclear weapons, Israel might even decide
(rationally) to launch a nuclear preemption against these weapons.
This would appear to be the only circumstance in which a rational
Israeli preemptive strike could be nuclear.87
There are other problems. To function successfully, Israel's
deterrent, even after being removed from the "basement," would
have to be secure from Arab preemptive strikes. Moreover, Israel
must also be wary of "decapitation," of losing the "head" of its
military command and control system because of enemy first
strikes. Should Israel's enemies be unpersuaded by Jerusalem's
move away from deliberate ambiguity they might direct such strikes
as could effectively immobilize Israel's order of battle.
The prospect of Israeli preemption will likely increase also
because rival states that acquire nuclear weapons will be unwilling
or unable to create the essential infrastructure to safely manage
these weapons. Inadequate investment in nuclear weapons systems
survivability, for example, could generate dangerous incentives to
preempt. With Israel's enemies unlikely to possess a second-strike
capability-the capacity to retaliate after absorbing an Israeli
attack-these states may calculate a substantial military advantage
to striking first. Recognizing this calculation, Israel will confront
a day when all irreligious leaders are deposed and the Ummah (total community
of Muslims) is united under a universal Caliphate, a fully legitimate government
ruled by an elected leader of irreproachable integrity. Whereas Iran's faith is
drawn primarily from the minority Shi'a branch of Islam, Egypt's fundamentalists
look forward to an alliance with over 130 million Sunni Muslims in the rest of the
Middle East and North Africa (there are now nearly one billion Muslims in the
world). Such an alliance, led by the so-called Jaamat Islamiya (Islamic societies)
and including Al-Jihad (Holy War) could lead to a position of "no compromise"
with infidels, especially if it is heavily informed by the Manichean type dualism of
Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), a leading ideologue of the Brotherhood who was hanged
by Nasser.
87. Even as we approach year 2000, repeated crises center on problems of
U.N. inspections and persistent Iraqi cheating. On October 7, 1991, more than
seven months after conclusion of hostilities, United Nations inspectors discovered
a complex of buildings that served as the nerve center of Saddam Hussein's covert
nuclear weapons program, but had escaped allied attack during the war. It was
here, at an installation called Al Atheer about 40 miles south of Baghdad, that
Iraq planned-according to the report-"to design and produce a nuclear device."
See Paul Lewis, "U.N. Aides Discover Atom Arms Center Concealed by Iraq,"
The N.Y. TIMES, Al, A7 (Oct. 8, 1991). Further, according to Hans Blix, director
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq was working on thermonuclear
weapons as well as simpler fission arms. See Id.
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an overwhelming incentive to strike first itself. Even in the best
case scenario, wherein Israel receives credible assurances from its
enemies concerning rejection of first-strike options, Jerusalem will
inevitably understand that such assurances could become meaning-
less in the wake of political upheaval, coup d'etat, etc. Faced with
enemy states characterized, by weak and authoritarian political
institutions, fragile civil-military relations, and competing factions
representing numerous ethnic and religious groupings, Jerusalem
will no doubt recognize the danger posed by alienated elements
within enemy societies-a danger for which Israel's only reasonable
antidote is apt to be preemption.88
A contrary argument about the effects of Palestine on Israel's
inclination to preempt suggests that because of Israel's newly
expanded vulnerability its nuclear deterrent would be more credible
than ever before. As a result, Jerusalem could better afford not to
strike first than when it still administered the territories. In this
situation the principal benefit of shifting from ambiguity to
disclosure would seem to lie in an explicitly-identified escalation
ladder revealing a broad array of intended Israeli reprisals, ranging
from limited conventional responses to measured nuclear strikes.
Such reprisals, of course, would be subject to the codified and
88. The major surface-to-surface (SSM) missile threat to Israel is from missiles
equipped with chemical or nuclear warheads. Until it becomes possible to reliably
intercept SSMs in flight, the Jewish State will have to focus on destroying them
while they are still on the ground. Should this preemption option be undertaken
in the near term, it could not be complemented by effective anti-tactical ballistic
missile (ATBM) defenses. If, however, it could be undertaken more than two or
three years from now, it could be reinforced by "Arrow" missiles that are
integrated into a multi-stage system for in-flight interception. Nevertheless,
recalling the extraordinary destructiveness of even a single nuclear missile that
would defy interception, it is unlikely that an Israeli deferral of preemption would
be cost-effective. Unless the Arrow were judged nearly 100% effective (an
inconceivable judgment) and unless Israel's enemies judged certain not to attack
until Jerusalem's ATBM deployment were complete (an impossible determina-
tion), near-term preemption (for all of its political and military costs) would
appear to be more rational.
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customary restraints of the laws of war, 9 especially the rules of
proportionality.9"
In weighing the different arguments concerning the effect of
Palestine upon Israeli preemption, particular attention must be
directed toward Israel's presumptions about the inevitability of war
and the long-term expectations for Arab vulnerability. Should
Israel's leaders conclude that the creation of Palestine would make
another major war inevitable and that, over time, Arab vulnerabili-
ty to Israel would diminish, Jerusalem's inclination to strike first
would be increased.
89. See Samuel Pufendorf, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN, for an early
expression of limits under the law of war: "As for the force employed in war
against the enemy and his property, we should distinguish between what an enemy
can suffer without injustice, and what we cannot bring to bear against him, without
violating humanity. For he who has declared himself our enemy, inasmuch as this
involves the express threat to bring the worst of evils upon us, by that very act, so
far as in him lies, gives us a free hand against himself, without restriction.
Humanity, however, commands that, so far as the clash of arms permits, we do not
inflict more mischief upon the enemy than defense, or the vindication of our right,
and security for the future, require." ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW (De Officio Homonis et Civis Juxta Legem
Naturalem Libri Duo), (Vol. II) (tr. by Frank Gardner Moore, Oceana Publica-
tions, Inc.) 139 (1964).
90. The principle of proportionality, has its origins in the biblical Lex Talionis,
(law of exact retaliation). The "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" expression is found
in three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, or biblical Pentateuch. These
Torah rules are likely related to the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686 B.C.)-the
first written evidence for penalizing wrongdoing with exact retaliation. In matters
concerning personal injury, the code prescribes an eye for an eye (#196), breaking
bone for bone (#197) and extracting tooth for tooth (#199). Among the ancient
Hebrews, we should speak not of the lex talionis, but of several. The lex talionis
appears in only three passages of the Torah. In their sequence of probable
antiquity, they are as follows: Exod. 21:22-25; Deut. 19:19-21; and Lev. 24:17-21.
(All have affinities to other Near Eastern codes.) These three passages address
specific concerns: hurting a pregnant woman, perjury, and guarding Yahweh's altar
against defilement. In contemporary international law, the principle of proportion-
ality can be found in the traditional view that a state offended by another state's
use of force can, if the offending state refuses to make amends, take "proportion-
ate" reprisals. See Naulilaa Arbitration, 1928, 2 RIAA 1013; Air Services
Agreement Arbitration, 1963, 16 RIAA 5; cited by Ingrid Detter De Lupis, THE
LAW OF WAR 75 (Cambridge University Press) (1987). Evidence of the rule of
proportionality can also be found in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966 (Article 4). Similarly, the European Convention on
Human Rights provides at Article 15 that in time of war or other public emer-
gency, contracting parties may derogate from the provisions, on the condition of
rules of proportionality. And the American Convention on Human Rights allows
at Article 27(1) such derogations in "time of war, public danger or other
emergency which threatens the independence or security of a party" on condition
of proportionality.
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Are such presumptions reasonable? Regarding the inevitabili-
ty of war, current Arab rearmament efforts and associated
preparations for conflict certainly suggest little else. As for Arab
vulnerability to Israel's military forces, this will depend primarily
on relative adaptation to the changing technologies of war, a
process that cannot be accurately evaluated at this time. It follows
that unless Israel's leadership believes that shifting from ambiguity
to disclosure would greatly inhibit all or virtually all enemy Arab
forces (i.e., to the extent that war would become not inevitable, but
decreasingly probable), Palestine would make Israeli preemptive
attacks more likely.
Does this mean that the creation of Palestine would make
Israeli nuclear deterrence irrelevant? Not at all! Although nuclear
weapons might not serve Israel as an assured means of deterring
enemy first strikes, they could function to support Israeli preemp-
tions. Here, Israel's adversaries-having suffered Israeli attacks on
various hard targets and military installations-would be deterred
from retaliation against the Jewish State by the threat (implicit or
explicit) of Israeli nuclear counterretaliation. It is conceivable, of
course, that this nuclear strategy could fail and that Israel's nuclear
weapons would then have to be used for actual warfighting. The
only military strategy capable of preventing this prospect altogether
lies in Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons, a
strategy that would appear altogether inconceivable.
There appears to be only one contingency in which nuclear
warfighting options might appear cost-effective to Israel: to prevent
imminent destruction of the Third Temple. Faced with this
contingency, Israel would very likely threaten to use whatever
nuclear capability it had with the intention of carrying out the
threat. Should such threats be ignored, however, the resultant
nuclear destruction and societal disintegration in the region could
jeopardize Israel's continuance as a state, even though it had used
nuclear weapons only to stave off total annihilation.
Should Israel use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
adversaries to prevent such annihilation, its continuance as a state
would also be jeopardized, in this case for political reasons. To
assess the credibility of an Israeli nuclear threat under conditions
of expected annihilation, one needs to understand the special
perspectives of Jewish history. Plainly, virtually all of Jewish Israel
would view any concerted effort to annihilate their country as more
than war. Rather, they would view such an effort as part of an
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ongoing process of genocide, and this in spite of the historical
variation in perpetrators.91
When the territories become Palestine, will Israel be more or
less inclined to preparations for nuclear warfighting? Extrapolating
from what we have already assumed, namely that the creation of
another hostile Arab state and another "hot" border would
heighten the prospect of catastrophic war against the Jewish
state,9' it is almost certain that Israel would be substantially more
dependent upon its nuclear capabilities. Whether such capabilities
would be put to better use as part of an "assured destruction"
91. Jurisprudentially, we are also speaking here of "Crimes against humanity."
For definition of such crimes, See AGREEMENT FOR THE PROSECUTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN Axis POWERS
AND CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL. Done at London,
Entered into force, August 8, 1945. For the United States, Sept. 10, 1945. 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (Aug. 8, 1945). The principles of international law
recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the
Tribunal were affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly as AFFIRMATION OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED BY THE CHARTER OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 11, 1946.
U.N. GAOR 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946), at 1144. This Affirmation of the
Principles of International Law Recognized By the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal (1946) was followed by General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), adopted
November 21, 1947, directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a)
Formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft
code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind .... ." U.N. Doc.
A/519 at 112. The principles formulated are known as the PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZED IN THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL. Report of the International Law Commission, 2nd
session U.N. GAOR 5th session (Supp. No. 12), A/1316, 11 (1950).
92. Although it is generally believed that the peace treaty in force with Egypt
constrains that state from joining with other Arab forces against Israel, this belief
is problematic. A Minute to Article VI, paragraph 5 of the Israel-Egyptian Peace
Treaty provides that it is agreed by the parties that there is no assertion that the
Peace Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or that other treaties or
agreements prevail over the Peace Treaty. This means that the treaty with Israel
does not prevail over the defense treaties that Egypt has concluded with Syria, and
that Cairo-should it determine that Israel has undertaken aggression against
Syria-could enter into belligerency against Israel on behalf of Damascus. Indeed,
there is reason to believe that even if Syria were to commence hostilities against
Israel to recover the Golan Heights, Egypt might abrogate its agreement with
Israel and offer military assistance to Syria. Shortly after the Israeli-Egyptian
Peace Treaty was signed, then Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil stated that he
would regard any attempt by Syria to recover the Golan Heights as a defensive
war, one that would bring into play the Egyptian-Syrian defense treaty despite the
existence of the Israel-Egyptian Peace Treaty. For terms of the pertinent treaties,
see Treaty of Peace, March 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, Minute to Art. VI(5), 18 I.L.M.
362, 392: and Joint Defense Agreement Between Syria and Egypt, Oct. 20, 1955,
227 U.N.T.S., 126.
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strategy (MAD) or a "counterforce" (warfighting) strategy remains
to be calculated.
All things considered, Israel-if confronted by a new state of
Palestine-would be well-advised to do everything possible to
prevent the appearance of Arab nuclear powers, including pertinent
non-nuclear preemptions. Bringing its own bomb out of the
basement is unlikely to serve any serious purpose unless Jerusalem
were to conclude that Arab intractability toward the Jewish state
had become overt and overwhelming and that preparations for
nuclearization in particular Arab states could no longer be stopped,
even by Israeli preemptive strikes.93 Under these very portentous
conditions, Israel would require a very believable (and hence
usable) nuclear deterrent, 94 one that could be employed without
93. Because the entire Arab world, excepting Egypt and Jordan, still considers
itself at war with Israel, a strong case can be made that any Israeli preemption
against its Arab enemies would not be an act of anticipatory self-defense, but
rather only one more military operation in an ongoing and protracted war. It
follows that such an operation's legality would have to be appraised exclusively in
terms of its conformance with the laws of war of international law (jus in bello).
Here, to identify such an operation as an act of aggression against another state
that had already declared itself at war with Israel would be nonsense. The laws
of war, the rules of jus in bello, comprise: (1) laws on weapons; (2) laws on
warfare; and (3) humanitarian rules. Codified primarily at the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, and known thereby as the law of the Hague and the law of Geneva,
these rules attempt to bring discrimination, proportionality and military necessity
into belligerent calculations.
94. In assessing the reasonableness of nuclear weapons use, it is essential to
consider the variety of possible nuclear options. For example, although it is highly
unlikely that Israel would choose to use high-yield nuclear explosives that would
produce horrendously indiscriminate casualties and fatalities throughout the region
(including perhaps radioactive fallout within Israel itself), it may be reasonably
likely to use low-yield, "small" nuclear explosives. In this connection, Israel might
choose to use enhanced-radiation weapons rather than nuclear explosives (weapons
that have been referred to by the strategic community as the "neutron bomb")
because these weapons would destroy people without destroying structures. The
neutron bomb, or ER warhead, (deliverable by artillery shells or missile warheads)
is a relatively small thermonuclear weapon that is designed to minimize the
fraction of energy going into blast and heat. Upon detonating, large quantities of
radioactive neutrons would be released, killing people but leaving buildings and
other structures unaffected. Because such a weapon could be used with less
"Armageddon potential" than other kinds of nuclear weapons, it may appear more
reasonable to use. At the same time, because the "spillover" effects upon the
using state could be harmful as those of other nuclear weapons, the reasonableness
of using the neutron bomb may be contingent, in the final analysis, on prevailing
winds and weather conditions. Enhanced radiation warheads would produce
appreciable fallout from the fission trigger (the neutron bomb is triggered by a
minimum-yield fission explosion) and their critical effect would be death spawned
by intense radiation.
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igniting Armageddon for all regional belligerents and one that
could serve some damage-limiting military purpose (whatever the
collateral effects) against Arab weapons (nuclear and non-nuclear)
should deterrence fail.
In his article in THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS,
"In the Shadow of the Israeli Nuclear Bombs: Egyptian Threat
Perceptions," Abdel Monem Said Aly - Director of the Al-Ahram
Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo - presents a
prevailing Arab (specifically Egyptian) view of Israel's undeclared
"nuclear bombs." Acknowledging his country's persistent pressure
upon Israel to sign the NPT, Professor Said Aly seemingly forgets
that Israel's strategic policies are fashioned in context. These
policies are not created in a geopolitical vacuum. Although, as the
author argues, "Both geography and history.. . have defined the
constants of the Egyptian perception of national security," it is
remarkably ironic to conclude that it was creation of the State of
Israel in 1948 that "constituted a major security threat to Egypt."
Even today, when a formal condition of peace obtains between
Egypt and Israel, the Egyptian side has ensured that the peace
remains an altogether cold one,95 and one that endures in the
midst of almost frenetic Egyptian militarization.
Professor Said Aly worries that Egypt is endangered from
Israel because the Jewish State "continues to possess a fanatic,
fundamentalist right wing. . ... " Yet, the Netanyahu Government
had refused to abrogate the enormously debilitating (to Israel)
surrenders compelled by Oslo and remained committed altogether
to defensive military policies. At the same time, authentically
fanatic, fundamentalist Islamic forces could topple the Mubarak
government at any moment, instituting a new regime in Cairo that
The destructive effects of the neutron bomb are due to the ionizing effects of
neutrons colliding with protons inside living cells. Ionization breaks down
chromosomes, swells cell nuclei, increases the viscosity of cell fluid, enhances cell-
membrane permeability, and destroys cells of all kinds, particularly those of the
central nervous system. Exposure to ionizing radiation also delays or destroys the
process of mitosis, a long-term genetic effect that inhibits normal cell replacement.
95. In AL AHRAM WEEKLY, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Mohammed Muawad Gad El-
Moula, founder of a new party to revive the "victorious spirit" of the October 1973
War, said: "Israel is not prepared to give up its ambitions. This is clearly reflected
in the declaration made by its leaders - and not only Binyamin Netanyahu ....
We have no choice but to adopt a platform for rebuilding a strong Egypt and
preparing a new generation capable of fighting any attackers .... We have to
prepare for a fresh confrontation with Israel." (24 - 30 Oct. 1996); see Aaron
Lerner, IMRA (Independent Media Review and Analysis) Views From Egypt (3
Nov. 1996).
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would likely terminate the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and move -
perhaps collaboratively - toward aggressive war. In this connection,
it is also worth noting that the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979
does not necessarily constrain Egypt from joining other Arab states
in a war against the Jewish State. A minute to Article VI,
paragraph 5, of the Treaty provides: "It is agreed to by the Parties
that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other
treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail
over this Treaty."
An uninformed reader, considering Prof. Said Aly's article,
would conclude that the history of Middle East conflict after 1948
was largely the result of persistent Israeli aggressions, several
through the Sinai. Of course, on May 17, 1967, President Nasser
demanded U.N. withdrawal from the Sinai in preparation for
Egyptian attack. By May 20, approximately 100,000 Egyptian
troops, organized in seven divisions, together with 1,000 tanks, were
concentrated along Israel's southwestern border.
After the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force demanded
by Egypt, THE VOICE OF THE ARABS proclaimed: "As of today,
there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect
Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain
any more to the U.N. about Israel. The sole method we shall apply
against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of
Zionist existence., 9 6 Two days later, an enthusiastic echo came
from Hafez Assad, then Syria's Defense Minister: "Our forces are
now entirely ready ... to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to
explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland . . . . The time
has come to enter into a battle of annihilation."97
With these facts in mind, Professor Said Aly claims to remain
concerned about an Israeli "surprise attack," and insists that Israel's
resort to anticipatory self-defense in June 1967 was merely
aggression. Looking to the future of the region, he insists further
that: "Militarily, Israel has secured for itself a position of superiori-
ty in both conventional and non-conventional weapons." Nothing
could be further from the truth. No other country in the Middle
East today is as effectively susceptible to catastrophic war as is
Israel. Deprived of its nuclear weapons, as Professor Said Aly
would recommend, Israel would not survive another year.
96. See Louis Rene Beres and (AMB) Zalman Shoval, On Demilitarizing a
Palestinian 'Entity' and the Golan Heights: An International Law Perspective, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 968 (Nov. 1995).
97. Id.
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But isn't this a contradiction? If Israel retains its nuclear
weapons, why should it be vulnerable to catastrophic war? The
answer has to do with the delicate nature of nuclear deterrence,
with the incapacity of nuclear weapons to stave off most forms of
conventional war and with the destructive synergy that might come
to exist between war and terrorism. Israeli does indeed have
nuclear superiority in the region - a superiority that is likely to
obtain for a very long time - but this condition does not necessarily
imply superior power. Recall, in this connection, the incapacity of
another major nuclear power - the United States of America - to
achieve power against a third world adversary then called North
Vietnam.
Reduced to its essential contours, Israel's existential problem
is this: A tiny state, indeed a microstate, surrounded by much
larger, steadily militarizing enemy states and by increasingly hostile
insurgent forces, seeks safety via credible deterrence, Yet, because
deterrence can be immobilized by various factors - for example, by
enemy perceptions of an Israeli unwillingness or incapacity to
retaliate; by irrationality of enemy leadership - Jerusalem must
once again plan for various forms of preemption. But defensive
first-strikes by Israel would be fraught with strategic and diplomatic
risks, and may in fact already be infeasible. Naturally, if any
realistic hopes could be placed in the so-called "Peace Process," the
bleakness of Israel's security options would certainly be improved.
But no such hopes are reasonable. Rather, the Oslo Accords with
the P.L.O. remain entirely injurious to Israel's survival require-
ments.
98
What about active defenses, e.g., the Arrow ABM to which
Prof. Said Aly refers? If Israel could soon deploy effective
defensive systems, couldn't Jerusalem forego any preemption
imperatives? After all, able to intercept incoming missiles, Israel
would have no tactical reason to strike first.
Here, a number of critical problems surface. First, in the very
best of all possible worlds, Israel's ABM deployments are at least
two to four years away. Hence, in the interim, Israeli vulnerability
to enemy attack will be especially high. Second, because even a
98. See, by this author: Louis Rene Beres, The 'Peace Process' and Israel's
Nuclear Strategy, STRATEGIC REV., 35-47 (Winter 1995); See also Louis Rene
Beres, The Security and Future of Israel: An Exchange, MIDSTREAM, 15-23
(June/July 1995), a debate with Maj. Gen. (IDF/Res.) Shlomo Gazit, former Chief
of the IDF Intelligence Branch; and Louis Rene Beres, The Oslo Accords and
Israel's Nuclear Strategy, GEO. COMPASS, 74-81 (Winter 1995/1996).
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single unintercepted nuclear or other unconventional warhead
could produce unacceptable damage, successful active defense will
require a near-perfect interception capability - a capability well
beyond realization.
Professor Said Aly, in the fashion of most scholars - Arab and
Israeli - examines Israel's nuclear strategy and the Oslo Peace
Process as if they were essentially unrelated.99 There is nothing
in Prof. Said Aly's argument to suggest that what happens to Israel
as a result of Oslo concessions will impact its decisions on nuclear
strategy and nuclear weapons. Yet, depending upon the precise
configuration of these ongoing concessions - which will in any event
be a more-or-less truncated Jewish State with greatly reduced
strategic depth - Jerusalem's reliance upon nuclear weapons and
strategy will vary considerably."°
There are important connections between territorial vulnerabil-
ities, creation of a Palestinian state and removal of the nuclear
bomb from Israel's "basement."' 0 1 For now, still buffered from
a "hot" eastern border by West Bank/Judea/Samaria, Israel can
reasonably afford to maintain its posture of deliberate ambiguity.
When, however, the Peace Process produces "Palestine," Israel will
likely feel compelled to move from ambiguity to disclosure, a shift
that would substantially increase reliance upon nuclear strategies of
various sorts.
Israeli nuclear weapons are not the problem. In the persistent-
ly bad neighborhood called the Middle East, the real problem is a
very far-reaching and entirely unreconstructed Arab/Iranian
commitment to "excise the Jewish cancer." Faced with this
commitment, the government in Jerusalem should understand that
the Peace Process is little more than a temporary enemy expedient,
99. But Gamil Mattar, Director of the Arab Center for Development and
Futuristic Research said, in AL AHRAM WEEKLY - 24-30 Oct. 1996: "Supporters
of peace in Israel should also declare themselves opposed to Israel's nuclear
weapons program .... How can an honest dialogue, conducted in an atmosphere
of good will, take place in the shadow of the Israeli nuclear arsenal" (emphasis
added; to highlight similarity to language of Prof. Said Aly). See Aaron Lerner,
IMRA (Independent Media Review and Analysis) Views From Egypt, (3 Nov.
1996).
100. See, by this author: Louis Rene Beres, The 'Peace Process' and Israel's
Nuclear Strategy, STRATEGIC REv., Vol. XXIII, No. 1., 35-47 (Winter 1995); see
also Louis Rene Beres, The Oslo Accords and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, GEO.
COMPASS, Vol. V., No. 1, 74-81 (Winter 1995/1996).
101. See, by this author: Louis Rene Beres, Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A
Second Look, ISRAEL AFFAIRS, Vol. 2, No. 1, 112-136 (Autumn 1995).
1999]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
a carefully contrived stratagem to eliminate Israel from the
neighborhood.
Israeli nuclear weapons are crucial to Israel's survival and to
regional stability. With such weapons, Israel could deter enemy
unconventional attacks and most large conventional ones.
Moreover, with nuclear weapons, Jerusalem could launch non-
nuclear preemptive strikes against enemy state military targets that
threaten Israel's annihilation. Without these weapons, such strikes
would likely represent the onset of a much wider war because there
would be no compelling threat of Israeli counterretaliation. Thus,
Israel's nuclear weapons are an impediment to the actual use of
such weapons and, inter alia, to the commencement of regional
nuclear war.
Professor Said Aly, of course, does not agree. He argues, for
example, that because of Israel's nuclear capability, "Egypt must be
totally dependent on Israel's good intentions." But why? Do these
Israeli weapons permit Jerusalem to demand certain political and/or
military concessions from Cairo? Certainly not. The Israeli
nuclear weapons can serve to prevent transformation of Egypt's
cold peace into another Egypt-led hot war, but they can assuredly
not be used to extort any forms of Egyptian surrender. Does
Professor Said Aly expect either an Israeli "bolt-from-the-blue"
nuclear attack or an Israeli threat to initiate nuclear warfare? How
could he? What would Israel have to gain?
Professor Said Aly is concerned about "a clear imbalance in
nuclear power relations." Fearing that Israel's "nuclear monopoly"
precludes genuine nuclear deterrence in the region, he chooses to
ignore altogether Egyptian and other Arab chemical and biological
weapons - counterdeterrent weapons that could pose a very effective
inhibitor of any Israeli nuclear retaliations. This means that Israel's
nuclear monopoly notwithstanding (a monopoly that is, incidentally,
a very temporary phenomenon), Jerusalem's nuclear deterrent is
increasingly subject to immobilization by enemy state threats of
chemical and/or biological counter-retaliations.
Professor Said Aly is worried that Israel's nuclear arsenal
prompts regional nuclear proliferation. This is an especially curious
argument because it places blame for the expected spread of
nuclear weapons not upon the actual proliferants, but upon their
intended victim. Moreover, while the author is correct that
"nuclear proliferation in the Middle East can be very destabilizing
for the entire region," the source of that prospective destabilization
is not Israel, a country - unlike certain of its neighbors - that has
[Vol. 17:2
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never issued genocidal threats or launched missile attacks upon
civilian populations.
Professor Said Aly remarks on the alleged "discrepancy
between Israel's maximum needs and its actual nuclear capabili-
ties," concluding that this discrepancy "raises serious doubts about
the credibility of Israeli intentions." His point, it would seem, is
that Israel's nuclear weapons are presumptively for more than
minimum deterrence and may even be for aggression and/or war-
waging. Here, Professor Said Aly ignores many pertinent nuances
of nuclear strategy, especially the precise kinds of nuclear weapons
involved (not all such weapons are the same), the question of
countervalue vs. counterforce targeting, and the requirements of
national survival if nuclear deterrence should fail.
Professor Said Aly wonders about Israel's development of
tactical nuclear weapons, and perhaps nuclear mines. In this
regard, he worries that the decision to use such weapons might be
made more easily than a decision to use larger, strategic weapons.
Indeed, his worry is entirely well-founded. Israeli nuclear deter-
rence, to function successfully, requires nuclear weapons that are
perceptibly usable. This does not mean weapons that would
increase the risk of war; on the contrary, it means weapons that
would be decidedly stabilizing.
Professor Said Aly claims that Israel has actually deployed
some of its nuclear weapons in times of grave national emergency.
Although we have no way of knowing whether this claim is
plausible (neither, of course, does Professor Said Aly), the author's
fear - that "under conditions of crisis, when the use or the threat
of chemical weapons or conventional missiles in massive quantities
is real, Israel might use its nuclear weapons" - is certainly correct.
If Israel's Arab/Islamic neighbors do not want to witness such a
defensive Israeli use of nuclear weapons, all they need do is refrain
from chemical or massive conventional aggressions against the
Jewish State.
Professor Said Aly laments that "Israeli nuclear capability is
one of the ways for Israel to extract further means of conventional
superiority (emphasis in original) from the United States .... "
Yet, should Israel actually be able to achieve or maintain such
conventional superiority, Jerusalem's reliance upon nuclear
weapons could be expected to diminish.
Professor Said Aly comments upon the ambiguities surround-
ing Israeli command authority over nuclear weapons, conditions
which he fears, "in times of tension, uncertainty or national crisis,"
would exacerbate the prospect of "accidental use." Here we
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observe a rather clear non sequitur, as there exists no observable
relationship between clarity of authority structure and nuclear
weapons accident probability. Perhaps the author really means
unauthorized use rather than accidental use, but even this kind of
hypothesis would be prima facie incorrect. Knowing in advance
exactly who has the authority to order the use of Israeli nuclear
weapons could serve to identify unauthorized uses after the fact
(who would care?) but it would have no bearing on the possible
prevention of unauthorized uses by neighboring states. Further,
does Professor Said Aly really expect us to believe that any Arab
nuclear power in the region would disclose its relevant authority
structures?
Finally, Professor Said Aly faults Israel for "still refusing to
give Palestinians their statehood" and for its ostensible insistence
"on occupying Arab territories, including Jerusalem 
... "
Ironically, it has been successive Israeli governments that have
accorded legitimacy to the idea of Judea and Samaria as "occupied
Arab territories" and that have allowed the notion of Jerusalem as
a negotiable issue to be placed on the diplomatic table. Instead of
insisting upon maintenance of essential strategic depth and upon
the utter non-negotiability of Jerusalem - insistence necessary for
national survival - Israeli governments have persistently surren-
dered to annihilatory Arab demands.
Israel has a great deal to fear. Facing a growing number of
adversaries with ballistic missiles and with aggressive nuclear
development programs, Jerusalem should now understand that
transformation of Judea/Samaria/Gaza into Palestine will not
stabilize the region, but rather will provide Israel's enemies with
the means and incentives to destroy the Jewish State once and for
all. Deprived of territorial margins of safety, Israel could become
seriously vulnerable to total defeat. It follows that however loudly
Arab scholars and leaders might protest about Israeli "stalling" on
the territories, the matter of Palestinian statehood could have
existential consequences for Israel. Once such statehood is
accepted, Palestine, looking first very much like Lebanon, could
wind up as Armageddon, a metamorphosis that would favor neither
Israeli nor Arab in an always explosive region.
V. Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense
Preemption may be appraised not only from the tactical
perspective, but also from the standpoint of international law.
What, exactly, is the status of preemption under these important
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rules and procedures? Where it is understood as "anticipatory self
defense,"' 2 this customary right has its modern origins in the
Caroline incident, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of
1837 in Upper Canada against British rule. Following this incident,
the serious threat of armed attack has generally been taken to
justify militarily defensive action. In an exchange of diplomatic
notes between the governments of the United States and Great
Britain, then U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a
framework for self defense which did not require an actual attack.
Here, military response to a threat was judged permissible so long
as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means and no moment of deliberation." It goes without saying
that Israel would likely act upon precisely this kind of "danger
posed."
Today, some scholars argue that the right of anticipatory self
defense articulated by the Caroline has been overridden by the
specific language of Article 51 of the UN Charter. In this view,
Article 51 (which is the pertinent codification of the law) fashions
a new and more restrictive statement on self defense, one that
relies on the literal qualification of a prior "armed attack." This
narrowly technical interpretation ignores that international law
cannot compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating or even
lethal first strike before acting to protect itself. Significantly, both
the Security Council and the General Assembly refused to
condemn Israel for its 1967 preemptive attacks against certain Arab
states, signifying implicit approval by the United Nations of Israel's
lawful resort to anticipatory self defense.
The right of self defense by forestalling an attack °3 is well
102. For more by this author on anticipatory self defense under international
law, with particular reference to Israel, see: Louis Ren6 Beres, After the Gulf War:
Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self Defense, HOUS. J. INT'L L., Vol. 13, No.
2, 259-280 (Spring 1991); see also Louis Ren6 Beres, Striking 'First': Israel's Post-
Gulf War Options Under International Law, LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP, L.J., Vol.
14, No. 1, 1-24 (Nov. 1991); see also Louis Ren6 Beres, Israel and Anticipatory
Self Defense, ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L., Vol. 8, 89-99 (1991); see also Louis Ren6
Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine, and Anticipatory Self Defense,
EMORY INT'L L. REV., Vol. 6, No. 1, 71-104 (Spring 1992). For an examination
of assassination as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by Israel, see
Louis Rend Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of
Israel, HOFSTRA L. REV., Vol. 20, No. 2, 321-340 (Winter 1991).
103. Under certain very residual and carefully constrained circumstances, this
right of self-defense may even include assassination. See, e.g. Louis Rend Beres,
On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: Is it Permissible?, U. DET. MERCY
L. REV., 701-723 (Winter 1992); see also Louis Ren6 Beres, The Permissibility of
State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace and War, TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.
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established in classical international law. As long ago as 1625,
Hugo Grotius, in Book II of The Law of War and Peace, indicates
that self defense is to be permitted not only after an attack has
already been suffered but also in advance, where "the deed may be
anticipated." Or as he says a bit later on, "It be lawful to kill him
who is preparing to kill ... ." Similarly, in his text of 1758 known
as The Law of Nations, Emmerich de Vattel asserts that "The
safest plan is.to prevent evil," and that to do so a nation may even
"anticipate the other's design ......
Appropriately, because we are here concerned with the
prospect of Israel's preemptive strikes, both Grotius and Vattel -
"founding fathers" of international law - parallel the traditional
Jewish interpreters. The Torah contains a provision exonerating
from guilt a potential victim of robbery with possible violence if, in
self defense, he struck down and, if necessary, even killed the
attacker before he committed any crime (Ex. 22:1). In the words of
the rabbis, "If a man comes to slay you, forestall by slaying him!"
(Rashi: Sanhedrin 72a). Although these arguments speak more
generally of interpersonal relations than of international relations
in particular, they are valid for the latter by extrapolation.
Israel's right to preempt under international law is strength-
ened further by the ongoing nature of war with enemy states.
According to Grotius, citing to Deuteronomy in his THE LAW OF
PRIZE AND BOOTY, the Israelites, however, were exempted from
the issuance of warning announcements when dealing with previous
enemies (what we might call today ongoing or protracted war;
precisely the condition that currently obtains between Israel and all
Arab states except Egypt and Jordan). The Israelites, recounts
Grotius, had been commanded by God to "refrain from making an
armed attack against any people without first inviting that people,
by formal notifications," to establish peaceful relations ......
Yet, he continues, the Israelites ....
J., Vol. 5, No. 2, 231-249 (1991).
104. On the argument that war need not by formally recognized, see J. Pictet,
IV Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War 20-1 (1958) ("no need for formal declaration of war, or
for recognition of the existence of a state of war"); see also U.S. Dept. of Army
FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 7-8, paras. 8-9 (1956) (instances of armed
conflict without declaration of war; law of war applies); see also The Prize Cases,
67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668 ("war may exist without a declaration on either side");
see also M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER, 97-113 (1961) (legal status of war may be brought about by use of armed
force).
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thought that this prohibition was inapplicable to many of the
Canaanite tribes, inasmuch as they themselves had previously
been attacked in war by the Canaanites.
Hence, says Grotius, "we arrive at the following deduction":
Once the formality of rerum repetition has been observed and
a decree on the case in question has been issued, no further
proclamation or sentence is required for the establishment of
that right which arises in the actual process of execution. For
[and this is especially relevant to modern Israel] in such
circumstances, one is not undertaking a new war but merely
carrying forward a war already undertaken. Thus the fact that
justice has once been demanded and not obtained, suffices to
justify a return to natural law ... 105
VI. Conclusion
A Palestinian State could do nothing to end the "war already
undertaken" between Israel and its existing state enemies. Rather,
as we have just seen, it would enlarge this category of enemies by
one, undermine Israel's security further by reducing strategic depth
and allowable mobilization time, and heighten the chances of Israeli
preemptive strikes and/or regional nuclear war. Although this does
not suggest that "world order"1" considerations in the Middle
105. See COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY, supra, at 102.
The idea of natural law is based upon the acceptance of certain principles of right
and justice that prevail because of their own intrinsic merit. Eternal and immuta-
ble, they are external to all acts of human will and interpenetrate all human
reason. This idea and its attendant tradition of human civility runs continuously
from Mosaic Law and the ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day. For a
comprehensive and far-reaching assessment of the natural law origins of interna-
tional law, see Louis Rend Beres, Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and
the Prevention of Genocide, AM. J. JURIS., Vol. 33, 123-159 (1988). This article
was adapted from a presentation at the International Conference on the Holocaust
and Genocide, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 1982.
106. Brought into fashion by the Bush administration, the concept of "world
order" as an organizing dimension of inquiry and as a normative goal of global
affairs has its contemporary intellectual origins in the work of Harold Lasswell and
Myres McDougal at the Yale Law School, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn's
WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW (Harvard University Press) (1966) and
the large body of writings of Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Medlovitz. For works
by this author, who was an original participant in the World Law Fund's World
Order Models Project, see LouIs REN8 BERES AND HARRY R. TARG, CON-
STRUCTING ALTERNATIVE WORLD FUTURES: REORDERING THE PLANET
(Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1977); see also LOUIS RENI BERES
AND HARRY R. TARG, EDS., PLANNING ALTERNATIVE WORLD FUTURES:
VALUES, METHODS AND MODELS (Prager Publisher) (1975); see also LOUIS RENt
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East be determined without regard for Palestinian claims regarding
human rights and self-determination, it does suggest that these
claims be balanced against comparably important expectations for
area-wide peace and stability. In this connection, it must also be
recalled that such expectations would impact all pertinent popula-
tions, Palestinians as well as Israelis; that the consequences of
diminished regional security (including nuclear war) could harm
everyone, perhaps even irretrievably.
BERES, PEOPLE, STATES AND WORLD ORDER (Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock
Publishers, 1981); see also LouIs RENt BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).
